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Focus

SERMON PREACHED BY THE RT. HON. JOSEPH GRIMOND, P.C., M.P. on 30th April, 1961, at St. Giles' Cathedral, Edinburgh, as guest preacher to the University.

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"*But in the congregation I would rather speak five intelligible words for myself, than thousands of words in the language of ecstacy.*"

The Churches have recently issued a new translation of the Bible. This has made me think about a new translation into modern life of the Church itself.

The Church today is no longer a dominant authority in the land. It doesn't represent orthodoxy. Nor is it accepted as an arm of Government. Still less is Government an arm of the Church. The Church can no longer assume that non-churchgoers have lapsed only through idleness or from acceptance of a way of life they know to be wicked. Most of them have doubts of varying intensity about the fundamental beliefs of religion.

The Church is therefore now much more in the position of the early Church—the Church of the Pauline epistles—that is, a centre of religion in a pagan world.

This decline from a position of dominance is not wholly a disadvantage—it gives a freedom which the Church has only partially used. It means, however, that it must take up a new position and divide its work into two halves.

Of course, the Church's prime task is the worship of God. For that purpose it is entitled to speak with tongues—to use the ecstatic language which St. Paul mentions—and which convinced Churchmen understand. But I believe we are all in its debt when it undertakes a different task; when it speaks intelligibly to the great puzzled, groping mass of semi-Christian, semi-pagan, unecstatic humanity to which most people belong. It is about the five intelligible words which St. Paul prefers to the thousands of words in the language of ecstacy—that I am talking today.

Each generation puzzles about values and conduct. We are no exception. There is a demand for something beyond the easy slogans

of material complacency. And when there is no conscious demand you get the unconscious drift into boredom or violence or purposeless activity like a machine I once saw in a works which suddenly broke loose and began pouring out a clattering stream of half-made bolts. For the devout, the Church has a sure answer to these puzzlings. But it can also help the doubtful. To do this, however, it must think through its position.

What is at the root of the dissatisfaction which people feel about their own lives today? Much of it lies in the failure of our society to offer any scope or a reasonably high level to our imaginative, our emotional, our creative, or our moral instincts. If you read the more expensive books or periodicals or the more intellectual Sunday newspapers you will find good comment, criticism and description. You will garner the results of historical or scientific research. There is plenty of news—though oddly chosen. The same is true of the more serious television and radio programmes. From "Tonight" to the Third Programme, we get mostly exposition or comment. There is much valuable knowledge about, but prophecy in the sense St. Paul used the word is lacking.

It is this prophecy which we need. We need to be advised how to use all this knowledge, just as we need to be advised how we can make use of all the scientific devices which society now possesses, not only to make that society affluent but to make it rewarding to the spirit. This certainly does not mean rejecting criticism of science but it does mean developing the imaginative, emotional, creative side of life which today is exploited too much by the Advertising Agency and the publishers of paper-backed shockers. Our emotions are being left to commerce.

I want the Church to leaven the dough of modern society. To do that it must get some leverage in the dough even if it does so from a narrow base.

Many of the epistles—from which my text is taken—are about this problem—about applying the New Testament to practical conduct by Christians in a non-Christian world. Is it not time that the Church went back to the Gospel and wrote a new set of Epistles about the application of the Gospel in the light of modern research and a modern society.

Now conduct is at least as closely allied to emotion and imagination as it is to pure reason. The Church's perennial task as I see

it is about the creative instinct in man and to point to the longer term considerations and show how the advantages, whether of greater knowledge or greater wealth, can be used to gain satisfaction recognised as higher and more rewarding than the purely material because they flow from the divine spark of creation.

The philosophy which has increasingly prevailed during the last 180 years in the philosophy of empiricism and the scientific method. We can take some pride that it was given us modern shape by David Hume. To me, it is a wholly acceptable philosophy within its context. And I believe that Hume would have agreed, for he has a warm and humane man. But a system of examination, logic and scientific advance does not pretend to deal with the world of the emotions and imagination: Let me make it clear that I am not saying that knowledge is irrelevant in the creative world—any more than learning how to drive a car is irrelevant to making a journey. But learning how to drive can't tell you where to go. The creative world is the world of the artist.

And in a sense we are all artists. This is a religious world. Furthermore, religion and humanism come together in this world. I should like the Church to stress this more than it does. Increasing ease in material things should release both the Church and the general population for wider and more imaginative activities: for art, for new friendships, for a more creative view of our communal life. Let the Church first proclaim that it is not concerned in this context with the critical implications of, say, modern Oxford Philosophy. It is concerned with Aesthetics. Let it also take its stand against a new Gresham's Law—perhaps I should say a Parkinson's Law—by which the amount of routine work always fills the opportunities for more adventurous living which science ought to provide.

Then let the Church get back to the kernel of truth in the traditional moral ideas of Christianity and interpret them anew for a Welfare State and a modern Industrial Democracy. Love and personal relations have been affected by modern psychology—how far we have moved too in the treatment of women since Paul wrote the epistles. A good deal of the Orthodox Church teaching about personal relations is regarded by people today as in Pauline terms the language of ecstacy rather than prophecy. What does charity mean in the Welfare State? Surely service as well as the giving of money; service overseas in Africa or Asia, service in teaching, service to the mentally

ill or the old. What does the parable of the talents mean today? That time should be saved by, say, washing and washing-up machines and put to better use. It is a sin not to use energy-saving devices——it is equally a sin not to use for other purposes the energy so saved.

Now I turn to the question of how the Church can align itself to fulfil this role. It must be ready to take up new vantage points. It must perform the difficult feat of being right in people's daily lives and sympathetic to their desires yet continually standing back a little—pointing out that there is something more—in fact prophesying.

To start with, there is no advantage in being Established. The Church is not now closely bound up with the State. And as I believe that the supreme Sovereign National State is on its way out, this is an additional reason for breaking too close an association. Christianity in any event is a religion of disturbance and dissent. To Establish it is like dressing a growing boy in an Eton collar.

Nor do I think that the Parish system is satisfactory. It is a relic of the days when the Church was predominant and concerned with many services—such as Poor Relief—now undertaken by the State. In most cities the Parishes have lost their importance as natural groupings. It is paradoxical that in the places where the Parish is of significance such as my own constituency, we cannot get ministers to man them.

There is much essential work still to be done by the local minister, but he needs to be supplemented by a series of Church centres. The Church of Scotland has an excellent system of lay church government. I would like to see this developed and these centres partly run by laymen and women. I should like to see work by laymen and women increased. They should take on in modern terms something like the work once done by the monasteries. I welcome the interest of the Church in art and politics. I see these church centres as centres of art and political discussion of the longer term—not the immediate Party issues. I see them sponsoring television programmes.

I see them, too, gathering up the new knowledge at our command and looking at how it should be used. I see the centres concerned with the use of leisure and from them I see issuing a lead on personal and group problems.

This brings me to the importance of the groupings in which people today lead their lives. Morality within groups and between groups

seems to be neglected. For instance, morality within industrial relations or the morality of pressure groups and the obligations of men as trade unionists or employers or lawyers—or the moral implications of limited liability in companies. Can a company as opposed to its members have a moral obligation to give to charity, for instance?

The "worker-priest" was surely a step in the right direction so long as the priest does not lose his priestliness and become a cog in the system. I regret that service chaplains have to dress as Captains or Colonels because it is not the Church's role to become part of any lay system but to remind people to think about the wider implications of their ordinary jobs. It is surely time women could be ordained.

I would like to see the Church abandon its present clerical dress. Not that I am against some distinctive mark to show that a man is a minister. But the present dress seems to emphasise a rather forbidding critical outlook whereas the Church should be emphasising the claims of the imagination in a dull, mechanical age.

Certainly if I am right in this the Church should look at the public impact of its services to see what appeal they have to the imagination. And as for the buildings themselves, I should like to see most of them white-washed outside and brightly painted.

I mention these matters not as gimmicks. As I have said, I would not presume to make suggestions on the theology or worship of the Church. But its public face is comparatively modern. It may have been appropriate when it was invented. It is not so appropriate today.

These reforms would make it easier to see what the Church stands for.

Events and intentions crowd upon us every day. We have to relate them to some continuing idea of civilisation—civilisation not for the scholar and the specialist—but civilisation which everyone can appreciate and in which everyone has their part, a civilisation which is creative.

We know of no civilisation which can do that except one irradiated by Christian morality. The Church gets far more criticism than active help and it is for us all to help it if we believe in its task. Part of that task is to encourage us ordinary people to widen our horizons and look past the things temporal to the things eternal, beyond the bounds of critical reason to horizons of creative reason.

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Biochemistry, Other Worlds and Christian Doctrine

DUNSTAN JONES, C.R.

From time to time the Church is faced with new discoveries or new interpretations of the world which appear to call in question interpretative doctrines or expectations that had been believed to be among its fundamental tenets. The early Christians were soon driven to give up their expectations of the early return of the Lord. The voyages of discovery, beginning in the fifteenth century, and bringing with them knowledge of previously unknown tribes and their customs, made it difficult to uphold the doctrine of natural law, at least in its crude, pre-Thomist form, as a sort of highest common factor of the customs of all people. The astromomical discoveries of the Renaissance made it impossible any longer to look upon the Earth as the physical centre of the universe.

The Theory of Evolution, put forward in the last century, has frequently been held to have undermined the Church's doctrine of creation and doctrine of man. It is now commonly held by educated Christians that this is not so, and that the ensuing quarrel should never have occurred—though the greater responsibility probably falls upon some Christians of the time whose narrowness of conception stands in unpleasant contrast to the broader notions of the Fathers. Nevertheless, the tacit, if not explicit, change in the notions of the theologians has been enormous. The accusation made by sceptics—that Christians are forever changing their outlook under the pressure of new discoveries but forever trying to pretend that they have never changed anything—may be unfair in its implied moral imputations and may show a misconception of what is fundamental and what is not in Christian belief. But it must surely be admitted, after careful consideration, that the charges dig deeper than we have sometimes pretended.

There is reason to believe that further discoveries may again raise this sort of question in a most acute form. Two possible developments stand out for consideration: investigations into the nature of living matter, and the possibility of discovering living beings in other parts of the universe. Though superficially unconnected, we shall find that there is really a close connection between the two.

One still not infrequently comes across books written by Christians, which tell us (*a*) that the nature of life has never been explained, and which conclude from this (*b*) that a creator is necessary and, probably, (*c*) that the change from non-living to living matter involves the infusion of a new, immaterial substance to dominate the material. It is not the purpose of this article to deny (*b*) though it will be shown, incidentally, that belief in a creator does not rest on arguments of this kind. But the claim that "life has never been explained" is a dangerous one. Many things in the world have remained "unexplained" through tens of thousands of years of man's existence, but have ultimately been given an explanation, at least in the sense that science understands "explanation". There is no reason in principle why the "nature of life" should not yield in the same way, and (*c*) may then be found to be an unsatisfactory "explanation" of life.

The strides made in this investigation over the last few years have been remarkable. It has been found that both the individuals which make up a virus and the chromosomes which are the most important part of the nuclei of the cells of plants and animals are huge chemical molecules formed by joining together the smaller molecules of proteins and nucleic acids. Both have the property of acting as "templates" for the formation of new virus individuals or new chromosomes of identical form, i.e. both have the power of reproducing themselves (and this power can be explained in physical terms).

The chromosomes of cells appear in addition to act as "templates" for the formation of other substances which govern the processes within the cell and between cells—in other words, the basic physical life of the plant or animal.

Now in experiments carried out about four years ago by American biochemists, a virus was broken down into its constituent proteins

and nucleic acids, and they were later re-assembled so as to reconstitute the virus. The proteins and nucleic acids would not normally be said to be alive, but the virus was as much alive after its decomposition and reconstruction as before. It seems now to be only a matter of technical skill to synthesise proteins and nucleic acids from coal, air, water, etc., and to unite these in order to produce synthetically a virus capable both of reproducing itself and of feeding upon living tissues. There will of course be people who will say, "We won't believe it till it is done!" and others who will say, "We won't think about it till it is done!" But it seems more profitable to think about the implications of such an achievement, so as to be better prepared if and when it is done.

If a virus can be synthesised, so can a chromosome. Then it can only be a matter of technical skill to constitute living cells, since they depend principally on their chromosomes, which, as we have said, are very similar to virus individuals, If so, it should be possible to put together cells which will develop into plants or animals and (much as we may dislike the conclusion) something like a man.

II

Two sorts of theological questions seem to be raised—those with regard to the doctrines of man and the atonement. Both historically and in Hebrew theology, the idea of the revelation of God is prior to the idea of *creatio ex nihilo*. Yahweh in first revealing himself lets himself be taken for one among many gods. It is only through the history of Israel that he is seen to be greater and greater in power, and other gods less and less, until there is a radical trans-categorisation of thought and he is seen as unlimited in power and all else as dependant on him, and the other gods are now seen either as spirits dependant upon him or perhaps as not existing at all. Even so he was thought of for a long time as having made the world out of a pre-existing somewhat. The idea of a radical *creatio ex nihilo* came later. There seems to be no mention of it in the Bible till Maccabees II, Chap. 7, v. 28. Rabbis even later than the time of our Lord seem still to have thought of creation as a making out of some pre-existant stuff; and the distinction of some Eastern Orthodox theologians between μη ὀν and οὐκ ὀν ("nothing" and "absolutely nothing", so to say) seems not altogether free of this view.

The doctrine of creation is, essentially, that all else that exists does so by the Will of God; that there is absolutely no pre-existent substance out of which they are made, neither have they emanated from the divine substance. If God ceased to will the existence of the world, it would disappear without trace. The identification of Yahweh with Aristotle's "unmoved mover", which by its self-contemplation *unconsciously* generates the world and maintains it in motion, seems somewhat odd.

Creation is not to be thought of merely as "giving existence", which the creature then "possesses" and so continues to exist—the position of the deist. Rather God is to be thought of as maintaining his creatures from moment to moment. So in fact he not merely creates them from moment to moment, but creates them as doing what they are doing. This conception is perhaps a little difficult to get hold of when it is also to be insisted that this is not inconsistent with the partial free-will of some creatures. (God limits himself so far to the will of the creature.) But it enables us to see that all the activities of the creature are, from one point of view, mediated activities of God. Hence no human "creation" takes place apart from the ultimate creative act of God. So, if human beings succeed in synthesising living matter, this does not detract from the priority of the divine initiative. Such a possibility therefore, raises no problem relative to the doctrine of creation.

III

The doctrines of man and of redemption need rather more detailed consideration, however, and it is here that we must also take account of the possibility of discovering man-like, that is rational and moral, beings in other parts of the universe. The recognition of the possibility of other worlds goes back to Aneximander and Lucretius, and it was revived by Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century and by Giordano Bruno in the sixteenth. Bruno, when in England, influenced a number of English writers. Spenser refers to the possibility in the *Faerie Queene* and it was discussed by Francis Godwin (later Bishop of Llandaff and then of Chester) in a work published after his death, called *The Man in the Moone*. The same subject was taken up later in the seventeenth century by John Williams, also a Bishop of Chester, and a founder of the Royal Society.[1]. It has often been discussed since then, but not usually very seriously.

The growing understanding of the nature of living matter leads to a serious recognition of the possibility that it may always begin by the aggregation of suitable materials under suitable conditions. Hence, though the Christian will insist on the action of divine providence in any such process, yet its occurrence does not involve any *special* intervention in, or supervention upon, the processes of nature, that is, the appearance of living matter does not involve a *special* act of creation, but this does not contradict the doctrine of creation which we have already considered. Or to put it in more Hebraic terms, the divine initiative is manifested no less in other activities than in the origin of living matter.

It is conceivable then that living matter should arise, under suitable conditions, in many parts of the universe, and develop to all degrees of complexity—even the complexity of the moral animal. For this reason, the possible synthetic production of manlike being and the possible natural occurrence of man-like beings in other parts of the universe must be considered together. Though we have argued that a special divine intervention is not necessarily involved in the passage from non-living to living matter, we must still ask whether a special intervention is necessary in passing from non-human to human. Both the biblical conception of the nature of man and the Christian scholastic conception involve a special intervention in his creation, though differently conceived. These differences are related to the differences in the conception of the nature of the personality.

There have been many different meanings to the word "soul" and its equivalents. To some it means an immaterial substance dominating a material substance. To Aristotle it is the mere form of the body, which can, however, exist apart from the body, whereas the body cannot exist apart from the soul (the form of a dead body being a *new* form which takes the place of the soul as the soul leaves the body). It is plain that these views do not all come to the same thing. St. Thomas's view (which is the official Roman Catholic teaching) is not the same as the first stated theory (which many people no doubt take as the only possible account of the creation of body and soul).

But the Old Testament puts forward yet another notion, and the New Testament writers follow it rather than any contemporary

Hellenistic notions. To the Old Testament, the personality is wholly based in the body. It is essentially physiological in nature. The aggregate which is the body-personality was not, however, thought of as maintaining its own unity. Rather it was thought of as being held together by the continuing creative act of God. This is why, perhaps alone of all the peoples in the world, the Hebrews did not at first believe in any real existence after death. When the Jews, under Persian influence, came to do so, it was inevitably in terms of the re-creation of the body rather than the immortality of the soul. The manner of continuity between death and resurrection never seems to have been adequately worked out. Possibly there was supposed to be a gap. The creator who makes all things to be what he calls them to be, can bring again into existence the *same* man after a period of non-existence. St. Paul seems to think that the continuity of the Christian will be "in Christ"[2]. Later Christian "explanations" may seem philosophically more satisfactory, but they have no biblical warrant except in the apocryphal Wisdom books. It may also be difficult to reconcile them with the discovery that all the features of the personality seem to depend on the contribution of the brain, nervous system and endocrine glands.

The very significance of pattern in living things may, however, precisely make the revival of a philosophy of forms attractive. The transmission of patterns through the brain in the form of corresponding "projections" or representations, and the dependence of the physical contribution on the chromosome patterns both seem to make such a philosophy desirable. A recognition of the plurality of substantial forms, rather than St. Thomas's unity of substantial form, may seem preferable, so as to avoid the necessity of the introduction of a new form at death, but to see the soul as a continuing pattern would help us to escape some difficulties. If we can think of such a pattern persisting apart from the body, we can also think of its being re-realised in a body later on.

But such a view introduces other difficulties. A pattern is a universal, not a particular; and, for instance, it is difficult to see how there could be any distinction between the souls of identical twins. Again the persistence of a pattern suggests at least a medium through which it can be propagated—and this exceeds our powers of imagination in this case. To speak here of "continuity in Christ" would be to mix our categories of discourse, though it is perhaps to this that we might look for an escape.

If humanity depended on pattern rather than physical descent, then we could imagine its creation by molecular manipulation, rather than by a *special* divine intervention. The story of divine intervention would have to be understood as a way of setting forth the infinitely greater significance of man than of the lower creation in the mind and purpose of God. In making humanity depend on pattern rather than on physical descent, however, such a view depreciates the metaphysical unity of mankind which, as we shall see, has been the initial presupposition of the classical development of the doctrine of the Atonement. It would allow us to speak of a "synthetic man" as truly a man, and of the common humanity of physically unrelated Species, at the expense of making unimportant the actual unity of earthly men. We must turn, therefore, to the question of the Fall and the Redemption.

IV

Are such man-like beings in need of redemption and is the work of Christ on this earth the necessary and sufficient means of their redemption? These questions seem to have been debated in the sixteenth century. They have been raised again by the cosmologist, Professor E. A. Milne[3] and discussed by Dr. E. L. Mascall[4]. Milne asks whether the Incarnation was unique or whether it has been re-enacted on each of a countless number of planets. "The Christian would recoil in horror from such a conclusion. We cannot imagine the Son of God suffering vicariously on each of a myriad of planets.[5] But he suggests as a solution that the knowledge of the Incarnation "would be capable of being transmitted by signals to other planets and the re-enactment of the tragedy of the crucifixion in other planets would be unnecessary."[6]

Mascall shows that this involves a defective conception of the Atonement. It is not sufficient that man should *know about it*. The classical Christian doctrine of the Atonement, properly understood, is "that the Son of God has hypostatically united to himself the nature of the species that he has come to redeem and, by offering himself to God the Father in this nature, has offered them to God the Father in him . . . By dying and rising again in human nature, Christ has re-united human nature to God . . . "[7]

There seem to be at least six possibilities. Either:

(*a*) there are no other man-like species in the universe; or

(*b*) other man-like species are not involved in the Fall (as suggested by C. S. Lewis in his *Perelandra*[8]; or

(*c*) the relation of these species to God is different from that of man, so that an Incarnation is not necessary for their salvation; or

(*d*) the work of Christ as man effects all that is necessary, without their being hypostatically united to him; or

(*e*) they are to be hypostatically united to him through baptism and the administration to them of the other sacraments; or

(*f*) the Son of God has become incarnate, in every such species.

It is the teaching of the Bible and the Fathers that man is not only the summit of creation (to whom even the angels are ministering spirits[9] and who shall judge angels[10]) but in fact the high priest of creation, offering it to God, and the vice-gerent of God, ruling it on behalf of God. A not insignificant number of theologians throughout the history of the Church have believed that God the Son would have become incarnate even if there had been no Fall.[11] But certainly, by the work of Christ, redeemed man has been restored (within the Church) to these functions of high priest and vice-gerent. We are not saved merely for our own sakes, nor just in order to convert others in turn, nor even just to worship God in the Church (though all these are true), but so that we can share with God in the ruling of the universe.

Such a view has seemed to presuppose the unity of the whole human race, and Paul asserts the breaking down of artificial barriers within the human race; for not only Jews are to be saved, but men of all races. Certainly, "not of angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham"[12]—but not of the seed of Abraham only, but of men as such. It is because of the metaphysical unity of the human race that the Incarnation in one human body has been understood to bring about his hypostatic union potentially with the whole human race. This is why it has seemed that his aggregating matter to himself, not of a woman, would not have brought about the relation desired.

Yet in thinking this, it might be argued, we are limiting the powers of God. "God is able even of these stones to raise up childre n

unto Abraham"[13] for a thing is what the creator declares it to be. And, in a sense, men are raised not through their common humanity with Christ, but through baptism which unites them to Christ.

On the other hand it can be argued that the human race is not separate from nature, but grounded in nature—a Hebraic conception to which the Theory of Evolution has helped to bring us back—and salvation effected by Christ extends not just to men, but, as we have already seen, to the recapitulation of all things into Christ. From this point of view, it is arguable that there is a deeper unity than the unity of the human race, and that this characterises the material creation as a whole. If it is this unity which, so to speak, makes possible God's total work of salvation, then it seems necessary to recognise that not only man, but the whole material creation, is involved in the Fall. If it be held that only mankind, and that bit of creation which we have touched, are involved in the Fall, then the work of Christ loses the cosmic significance attributed to it in the New Testament. It becomes the clearing up of a little local difficulty which, by comparison with the part unaffected, does not deserve to be described even as a parochial. It would also follow that mankind has not the importance attributed to it in the Bible.

V

If the unity in question is held to be the unity of the material creation, and if, by implication, the whole material creation is involved in the Fall, then the story of Adam and Eve cannot be taken to be historical in the ordinary sense, nor can it even be taken as referring metaphorically to a series of wrong choices made by man. The Fall must be put further back. The Roman Catholic Church, for this reason, rejects the conjecture of "polygenism" (i.e., that the human race is derived not from one first human pair, but from a number of pairs whose parents were subhuman), in the encyclical of Pope Pius XII, *Humani Generis*.[14] The encyclical in this portion is concerned only with possible other man-like races on this earth, or with a possible group ancestry, but it would also rule out, by implication, the possibilities which we are discussing.

> "It does not appear how such views can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin, as this is guaranteed to us by Scripture and tradition, and proposed to us by the Church. Original sin

is the result of a sin committed, in actual historical fact, by an individual named Adam, and it is a quality native to all of us, only because it has been handed down by descent from him".[15]

The story of the Fall in Genesis 3 is notoriously difficult, however, and there are many people who will never accept its literal historicity. There is much in the animal creation which we feel constrained to call evil, and it is plain that this state of affairs has been in existence millions of years before man appeared. Attempts are made to show that the animals do not feel it as an evil in the way that men do[16], but many people are unconvinced. We cannot attribute this retrospectively to the fall of man. This being so, but believing that the Bible is the Word of God, we can only turn to typological interpretation.

It is pleasing to find an interpretation of the early chapters of Genesis in which Adam is seen as the type of Christ and Eve as the type both of the Church and of the whole creation.[17] Genesis, chap. 2, v. 4 is understood to represent the creation of the world within the Second Person of the Trinity as is "rite", and as posterior to his own eternal begetting from the Father. Genesis 1 v. 1-2 v. 4, on the other hand, is seen to represent the constitution of the Church, the *totus Christus*, as indeed of the whole creation recapitulated in Christ, as the crown of the work of creation. In this form it is the perfected work of God which is referred to and the Fall is therefore not mentioned. In Genesis 3 however, the corruption of creation (Eve) brings down the true Adam, not indeed into actual sin, but with the suffering which sin brings in its entail,[18] and "him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf".[19] (That Eve tempted Adam has commonly been used in making strictures upon women,[20] but it has more rarely been used *theologically* in the attempt to understand the purpose of this scripture. This treatment seems to be precisely that.)

If this view is legitimate, then we are free to look back to a Fall of all creation prior to, and not in consequence of, human sin. The nature of this Fall is less certain. We are at least free to suppose that spiritual agencies have been operative on the material creation and that they themselves have rebelled against God and corrupted the material creation (including man)[21] N. P. Williams tentatively suggested the existence of a World-Soul which had rebelled against God.[22] Mascall feels, no doubt rightly, that this involves too drastic a departure from the main body of Christian tradition.[23]

VI

If the unity, because of which the Incarnation of God the Son had its effect on the whole creation, is the unity of the material creation and not the more particular unity of the human race, it is less easy to see why the Incarnation should have been in human flesh and not in an aggregate of matter drawn at random. But if the Son of God incarnated himself in the human race because man is, without co-adjutor, high priest of creation and vice-gerent of God, then a unique function is ascribed to man which is not ascribed to other man-like species. It may be suggested that this is only a further example of the principle of particularity which God manifests in his work in the world. He chose the Jews rather than any other race (though all races are, in principle, to be saved), and the tribe of Judah rather than any other tribe, and the descendants of David rather than any other family, and Mary rather than any other woman. There is a difference, however, in that the human race was "made of one";[24] whereas earthly man must be more closely related to earthly animals and even non-living matter of the earth than to possible man-like beings in other parts of the universe, while a "synthetic man" would be less closely related than the animals.

If God works the salvation of other species by means other than the Incarnation, then the principle that the purpose of God is to take possession of the whole universe through re-united rational beings (i.e. the Church, the Body of Christ) is overthrown. If God the Son became Incarnate in every man-like species, then the universe is divided into (not clearly defined) parts so that a small part of it is taken up into the new relation with God through each of the Incarnations. Also Christ "must oft have suffered since the foundations of the world", whereas we believe that "now once at the end of the ages hath he been manifested to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself."[25] Further, the Resurrection and Ascension cease to be the glorious, overwhelming triumph and become a commonplace of the universe.

The only remaining possibility, if there be man-like species in other parts of the universe, is that such species should be united to him through baptism, after the acceptance of the Gospel, and that they should be maintained in this life, like us, by the administration of the other sacraments.

Such a discussion is inevitably inconclusive. Some people will think it unnecessary to pursue it unless and until other man-like species are discovered or a man-like creature synthesised. But such prospects are far from being impossible in principle, and it seems not altogether useless to make a preliminary consideration of the matter so as to know what principles we must take into account if such discoveries are made.

FOOTNOTES

[1] H. Bett: *Nicholas of Cura*, p. 174;
W. Boulting: Giordano Bruno, p. 139;
D. W. Singer: *Giordano Bruno*, pp. 50-61, 182-5.

[2] Thess., chapt. 4.16. 1 Cor., chapt. 15.8. Phil., chapt. 1.23. Cf. Rev., chapt. 14.13.

[3] E. A. Milne, *Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of God*, p. 153 (published posthumously).

[4] E. L. Mascall: "Is the Incarnation Unique"? in *Theology*, Aug. 1953, pp. 288-294. Reprinted with a short theologically unimportant, scientific interpolation in *Christian Theology and Natural Science*, pp. 36-45. Other relevant matters are discussed in other sections of this latter book.

[5] Milne: op. cit., p. 153, quoted Mascall, *Christian Theology and Natural Science*, p. 37.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Mascall: op. cit., p. 38.

[8] Republished as *A Voyage to Venus*.

[9] Heb., chapt. 1.4.

[10] 1 Cor., chapt. 6.3.

[11] Robert of Denty, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great (on balance), Duns Scotus, John Werrel Picus of Mirandole, Giacomo Nochianti, Osiander (a Lutheran), and B. F. Westcott. See Westcott, *The Gospel of Creation*, an essay included in *The Epistle of St. John*.

[12] Heb., 2.16.

[13] Matt., 3.9.

[14] Par. 37. Trans. by Mgr. R. Knox, published under the title *False Trends in Modern Teaching*, C.T.S.

[15] Ibid.

[16] E. L. Mascall, op. cit. p. 35 (quoting C. E. Brown with approval) and p. 300.

[17] L. S. Thornton, C.R.: *Revelation and the Modern World*, pp. 238-43.

[18] Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love*, chapt. 51.

[19] 2 Cor., 5.21.

[20] 1 Tim., 2.14.

[21] Mascall: op. cit., pp. 301-3.

[22] N. P. Williams: *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, pp. 525-30.

[23] Mascall: op. cit., pp. 303-4.

[24] Acts, 17.26 (R.V.).

[25] Heb., 9.26.

Evolution, Psychology and God

R. M. Appleby

We have heard much about Fr. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's great attempt to produce an evolutionary synthesis of cosmology, palaeontology and biology which would harmonise with his theological knowledge and life as a Jesuit monk. Unfortunately, I think it is true to say that most scientists disagree with the scientific side of his account on a number of points, not least among them his assertion that each particle in the universe has psychic activity and also that evolution runs counter to the general running down of the universe, i.e. that it is anti-entropic.

Without these two principles Teilhard's point of view collapses and we are left with the generally held view that the origin of man is brought about by natural selection operating on the human stock, as on all other animals and plants, in the way described by the Neo-Darwinists—that is, by environmental selection of particular assemblages of genetic material (Simpson, 1949; Ford, 1960).

Teilhard was right to attempt this synthesis because much Christian doctrine is dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, upon our views of the origin of man. For instance, Paul's account of the ingress of sin into the human race is a consequence of the "homo-sarcic" nature of mankind by virtue of our descent from Adam (Romans 5, 12-19). This leaves man in enmity (ἐχΘρα) to God with the relationship of God to man being Wrath (ὀργξ). The remedy for this is repentance, which is God's gift, and which brings reconciliation to God through the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus and this, in turn, brings the harvest of the spirit.

It seems to me that the picture of evolution given by Teilhard is deficient in that it makes no real provision for miracle and it was this which stimulated me to put my thoughts down on paper (Appleby, 1960). The core of Christianity is miraculous and, apart from possible initial miracle at creation, Teilhard's view of the universe is non-miraculous for, according to him, the universe is just

"working out" from earlier states to later ones without *special* intervention by God. On the other hand, on p. 29 of the *Phenomenon of Man* (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959) Teilhard claims that he has "marked the places where philosophical and religious thinkers, in pursuing the matter further, would be entitled, for reasons of a higher order, to look for breaches of continuity". In the footnote on p. 169 of the same work he accepts that "there is nothing to prevent the thinker who adopts a spiritual explanation from positing (for reasons of a higher order and at a later stage of his dialectic), *under the phenomenal veil* (Teilhard's italics) of a revolutionary transformation, whatever 'creative' operation or 'special intervention' he likes".

To me, the miraculous consists of anti-entropic interventions in the otherwise naturally functioning and changing universe. The interventions usually affect individuals or small groups of individuals and they appear frequently to stimulate change. The initial event occurs and information about the event is transmitted outwards in ever enlarging—and diluting—spheres. The resurrection was an intense individual miracle. It was a hardly less intense miracle for the immediate friends of Jesus. It was a wonderful sign for the citizens of and the visitors to Jerusalem and, since then, the wonder has decreased as the sphere has increased in time as well as space. Only where other individuals are touched by the miraculous does the trend of dilution reverse as, for example, in personal contact with God in prayer, at the Eucharist, in the mystical union and under circumstances such as those at Lourdes. It would appear that God's most intense communication is with individuals.

It is at just this point that misunderstanding between the religious and the scientific creeps in. When the biologist or palaeontologist talks of "evolution" he usually means "evolution of species" and a species is not an individual but a group. Species are defined in a surprising number of different ways to serve different purposes and to express different opinions but in all cases, with the exception of species which are nearing extinction, they are groups of organisms. Ideally, species are groups of animals or plants which are capable of interbreeding. They are—or have been, if fossil—reproducing populations and the scientific study of them is a statistical study using samples.

It is significant that change in an evolving population is initiated in a single individual or small group of individuals. It is their

individual assemblages of genetic material (genes, chromosomes, etc.) which change and if the changes cause their offspring to have even the slightest advantages over their fellows, these changed genes will be transmitted to an increasing number of descendants until the whole population possesses the new feature. As Teilhard has pointed out, origination of new genetic features only occurs in very small numbers of individuals and therefore the origins of new groups occur in very restricted areas of the globe's surface. Since only a minute proportion of past populations is ever recovered, our chances of sampling adequately the sequence of animals or plants in which a new feature is initiated is very small. Thus, in studying the evolutionary history of man, we are studying inadequate representatives only of a population which has been evolving since life began.

At any stage, then, since the days of the small furry quadrupedal ancestors of men, apes, lemurs, etc. in Tertiary times (about 75,000,000 years ago) there were populations which graded up through various evolutionary levels, splitting from time to time and resulting in our present assemblages of primates including ourselves. New features appeared from time to time, perhaps in single individuals, and spread out. The human characteristics appeared serially in the evolving population branch which led to us.

What, then, becomes of the One Flesh of Paul? There are three ways of looking at it. First, we can be strictly fundamentalist and continue to assert the unique direct creation of Adam and Eve who gave rise to the species. Most of our scientific evidence is against this. Second, we can assert that evolution has gone on by the progressive addition of our anatomical, physiological and psychological characters to the evolving population, all under the mechanistic Neo-Darwinian selection by the total environment which is, as it were, sorting out the randomly modifying (mutating) genetical structures. This denies the action of God except at the initial creation. Third, we can hypothesise *some* direction and intermittent control of evolution. This could occur at one or both of two points: (1) at the point at which the "random" alteration of the genetic material occurs (Appleby, 1960) or, (2) at the point in the environment which actively selects a given genetical structure. Since the latter is probably a less individual event, I favour the former as the more likely point of control in most cases.

At once it is important to say that there is no factual evidence that the third possibility has occurred. Current Neo-Darwinian theory is against it, supporters of the theory relegating the suggestion to the scrap-heap of vitalist hypotheses (Simpson, 1949; 1953, etc.). On the other hand the real possibilities outlined in PRISM 1960, of modifying the genetical material can be tested. Until the tests are carried out we are without evidence but *if* some such control is hypothesised, as it must be by Christians, we may look upon Adam as the first individual member of a large interbreeding population to possess the new and unique total pattern of genetical inheritance which carried him across an evolutionary threshold.

This point of view bears similarities to that of Teilhard but whereas Teilhard visulalised the population evolving by natural selection along the trend to the species as it stands at present, I visualise a unique intervention occurring at a point in an evolving population. Again, Teilhard's was a population working out its destiny without intervention. Mine contains the individual miracle. As both points of view agree, the mutations involved may have been very small, giving only very small anatomical and physiological differences from the other members of the population, but the change could have been of great psychological importance. For instance, it *may* have contributed to the psychological condition of unstable equilibrium in which Free Will operates—if Free Will operates at all. It is entirely in accordance with this view that the forebrain, which is the seat of "higher activities" in man, increased in various mammalian lines of descent, reaching a maximum in man (e.g. Edinger, 1948 on horses; Clark, 1959 on man). Against this we should keep it quite clear in our minds that this suggestion is almost certainly neither verifiable nor refutable. Teilhard has stressed the almost total impossibility of identifying a given individual or pair in the fossil representatives of the ancestral population and if, by some remarkable circumstance, we *could* identify the remains, all we would have would be bone and this would not help us with the question of the detailed structure and function of the brain.

On our interpretation, an act of free will would become possible after the crossing of the threshold and with this would come the possibility for Fall. The descendants of the original pair would also have that possibility. Paul held that sin enters through the Flesh (that is, our common ancestry or inheritance) and that God approaches through the spirit. The free option of action in accordance

with our Pre-Adamic nature would satisfy this tenet. The necessity of deliverance from this unfortunate consequence of free will, without abolishing the non-mechanistic possibilities, required the self-giving of Jesus followed by *the* great miracles of the resurrection and the sending of the Holy Ghost.

Perhaps we should examine the relationship between medicine, psychology and religion in terms of this hypothesis. There is no doubt that much of our I.Q. is inherited—as behaviour and psychological activity is genetically controlled to some extent in other animals and therefore, also, in our Pre-Adamic ancestors (Burt and Howard, 1956; Knight, 1950). There is also clear evidence today that much psychological difficulty can be alleviated by plain chemotherapy—that is, along plain mechanistic lines. This suggests that at least some neuroses and psychoses and hence some part of our "personalities" are mechanistic in origin.

It is also agreed that much wrong attitude is brought about by early environment—including parents—acting upon the infant up to about its seventh year. The environment makes its effect on the nervous tissues of the brain via the sensory organs, which detect energy changes associated with the changing environment (Hirst, 1959). Electroencephalography supports this. These sensory organs, nerves and nearly all the brain tissues were present while man's ancestral populations were still in the *Pithecanthropus* and *Homo neanderthalensis* stages. This would suggest that some trained-in attitudes leading to various kinds of behaviour patterns—likeable or dislikeable, healthy or unhealthy—belong to our more mechanistic animal natures—the Flesh. I suggest that psychiatry, as a branch of medicine, should be allowed to cope with these diseases or poor adaptations of the nervous tissues while religion copes with those situations in which free will can operate. It is obviously extremely difficult to decide whether or not it is possible, in a given case, for an individual to use his free will so the harmonious overlap of the fields of the psychiatrist and the priest is essential. Competition between the two would lead to disaster for some individual patients.

The actual issue involved in the act of free will varies from person to person according to his history. Also, within the life of one individual, issues rise and then cease to be issues. For instance, I was advised to give up smoking several years ago, At the time, to refuse a cigarette was a difficult thing and each new temptation required me to "force" myself not to smoke. There was obviously a fine balance

at this time and since I smoked sometimes and sometimes managed not to smoke, the decision must have been between fairly evenly balanced total opposing forces. All the factors leading me to smoke equalled all the factors leading me not to smoke. In other words, the issue of whether or not to smoke lay in the narrow "Neutral Zone" of free will. Since that time, the neutral zone has moved away from this issue. No doubt trained mental reflexes have grown up, and others declined, in my head, as a result of those first consistent ethical decisions, which have weighted the scales, balanced, as they were, on this narrow mental zone, so that today I always make the same decision. I never now smoke.

The study of ethic helps in all this and, if it is true that ethical decision—by free will—is made up of (1) principles acting upon (2) the best data one can obtain, then one is also required to assemble data. To do this fully seems to be foreign to many minds. The data include not only cigarettes, motives of others in offering them, and such considerations as expense, annoyance to others, effect on health and so on, but also knowledge of how the scales are weighted by one's past history. It may be impossible for my neighbour to give up smoking, in spite of all the above considerations, simply because his past history has weighted the scales. The pointer may not even have appeared on the indicator. This is to say that the issue does not lie in a neutral zone.

The priest who drives a man to "ethical" decisions which are impossible for him, is doing more harm than good because he is just increasing strain for him. I know of at least one case where a well meaning priest was informed by the mental hospital authorities that his amateur efforts to take a man "out of himself" by giving him jobs in the Church and exhorting him had delayed and jeopardised the recovery of a schizophrenic. Obviously, when to prescribe for a parishioner is extremely difficult for a priest to know and an added difficulty is that many G.P.s, particularly the older ones, are against "all this psychology nonsense" so he may be prevented from getting good advice there. Perhaps priests should take advantage of sick visiting to mental hospitals to seek advice. If not, there are many good consultants who would help.

All this sounds very mechanistic but I am sure it is not. At many, many points in our lives there are small ethical decisions which we are capable of making which lie in the true neutral zone. Each one made is a step in the building up of good character in the right

relationship to God. In all such decisions prayer for God's help (collect for Whitsunday) will surely be answered, God throwing his weight onto the side of good.

I should add, before leaving this topic, that, in accordance with my last article, the nature of miracle is such that any new organised state can emerge from any other state, organised or random, and this means that, if it is God's will, *any* change or decision can be made. However, it is inherent in human evolution over many millions of years, that we, the human species, can increasingly control our environments both collectively and individually. Since this is a part of evolving nature we must assume that this is how God wants it. Man's brain is part of God's work. It is thus incumbent upon us to use that brain to collect data, identify the small neutral zones within which we can make the ethical decisions God requires of us and then decide to subdue our pride and ask for help of God and/or men with the other larger zones.

Thus, psychiatrists and other medical men are *not* seeking to destroy our souls. Rather are they concerned to maintain our bodies and brains in good order so that ethical decisions can be made with the least interference from "the Flesh".

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"Adam, where art thou?"

ROGER TENNANT

The classical Christian system, for nineteen hundred years, revolved round the two poles of Adam's sin and the grace of Christ. Christ is still with us, much to our discomfort. Whatever else may go, "crucified under Pontius Pilate" remains firmly lodged in our history books. But the question "Adam, where art thou?" seems to produce no clear answer, even from the theologians.

The old Adam and the New, Paradise lost and regained, made of human existence a meaningful drama, bone of philosophy and milk of devotion. It entered into the whole of the West's psychology, poetry, literature and art, became the canvas on which our culture was embroidered. No wonder we have been loth to part with it. We need not be surprised that believers of the nineteenth century were appalled at any attempts to tamper with it. The whole Christian system was an inverted pyramid built on the first chapters of Genesis. If man had not fallen, where was Original Sin, and if there was no Original Sin, what meaning could there be in Redemption? But the experience of redemption in Christ was Western man's deepest and most meaningful spiritual experience, experience that could not be denied.

Thus, that boundless confidence with which the theologians first greeted Darwin and Huxley, was not merely obstinacy, but a confidence based on what seemed to be something so plain to the heart and conscience that to deny it would be a sort of solipsism, an existential suicide.

But Darwin and Huxley could not be denied, so rather than abandon Genesis, we have tried to re-establish it as "super-history", as myth that is more than myth, as the eternal truth about the human situation, and so on. But here the biblical tradition itself rises up against us, for the Bible purports to be a story worked out in time, to be history, history theologically interpreted, garnished, exaggerated, but still history. The writer of Genesis took what he knew of God, and what the science of his time told him about the nature of the physical universe, and he interpreted the science and the history in terms of what he knew of God. The stories of Genesis, and the view of human nature that is based on them, remain valid only so long as the science and the history they embody remain valid. To

give them a new and false existence as myths is to defeat the purpose for which they were written, to hinder our understanding of what has really been revealed to us both by modern science and by the coming of Christ. We need, not new and more imaginative interpretations of Genesis, but a new Book of Genesis, written in terms of the science and history of our day. This does not imply that we are better men than our forefathers, only that we are different men. It does not imply that the Bible is not inspired, but it does imply that men are still capable of inspiration.

The writer of Genesis began with the belief that God created the world. We begin with the same belief. But belief in "special creation", creation of a finished product in one act, and belief in creation as process, covering aeons of time, evolutionary, developing and changing, with a freedom that at every moment opens up infinite possibilities—these two beliefs are so utterly different that everything that follows from them is also different. They are mutually incompatible. To keep them both travelling together in our minds may be necessary until we have loaded certain essential insights of the old system into the new. But once the transfer has been made, the old system must be abandoned. We must face the fact that we are now on the voyage of the Beagle, and the Ark has served its purpose.

The writer of Genesis began with certain facts, which he had to interpret, and he gave them the only possible and logical interpretation, an inspired interpretation, eminently satisfying.

His facts were,

God is almighty, the Creator.

God is good.

The world is a mixture of good and evil, and man, though he can recognise goodness, and know God's presence in his heart, cannot live up to the good he knows, cannot obey the voice of conscience.

Given these facts, and a scientific view which thinks of creation as one completed act, it is impossible not to believe that the universe in its original form was perfect, and that man in his original nature was perfect. How could God make an imperfect universe? Everything he makes must be good and perfect. Therefore the present state of confusion must be due to a mistake, a fall. It cannot be God's mistake; therefore it must be man's. Man has done some terrible wrong—Newman's "aboriginal calamity"—and God is punishing him for it. As long as creation is thought of as a single finished act,

this is the only explanation that it is possible for a Theist to offer. It is not a complete explanation, because it still cannot explain the origin of evil. But it is the best explanation ever offered, and it was natural that as long as creation was thought of in these terms, it should be generally accepted. It is unfortunate that honest men who could not be satisfied with it were forced to be atheists or pantheists. That is a price that has to be paid for making theological systems. If we cannot but try to make them, let us at least be humble.

The writer of a new Book of Genesis is presented with the same set of facts, with the all important difference that he is no longer bound to the belief in a single finished act of creation. He does not have to explain why a good God made an imperfect world. He no longer has to justify God by postulating a fall of man.

It is often said that the starting point for all Christian thought must be not Genesis, but Jesus Christ, and it is well said. But really to make Jesus Christ the starting point is not so easy when all our thoughts about Him are coloured by the things written before He came, and things written after he came by people who believed the things written before He came. He cannot be contained by the Old Testament, or even by the whole of the New. If he is what Christian's believe Him to be, He is as wide as the world, as wide as the expanding universe, and in Him the whole of modern scientific thought can be, and must be interpreted. All this may seem very platitudinous, for has it not been the aim of all reputable theologians for the past hundred years to be doing just this? It has, and yet few of them seem to have really responded with joy, freedom and zest. They have been more concerned with salvaging curios from the wreckage of the Ark than in building a Christian space ship to carry us beyond the galaxies.

Evolution is grudgingly admitted to be true, as a probable explanation of certain biological facts about the human animal, unfortunate, humiliating facts, linking us with the ape, when we would rather be on the side of the angels. So we give the biologist his due, but rap his knuckles if he looks like trespassing on the "higher" fields of psychology or theology. But this is not the joyous attitude of the writer of Genesis, when he said, "God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good". It may be consistent with a platonic view of a "soul" in a cage of clay, but not with a Christian belief in a Word made flesh, and a resurrection of the body.

Instead of using the language of the twentieth century sciences as the tools of theology, we insist on talking the old holy jargon of Genesis and the Middle Ages, with a few concessions to the twentieth century where it squeezes. A good example was Dr. Mascall's "answer" to an article by Dr. Julian Huxley in *The Observer* last year. Professor Huxley gave the impression of an honest twentieth century man. Dr. Mascall gave the impression, as one of the subsequent correspondents said, of a man talking to himself. He brought out the same old set of theological counters, Fall, Redemption, Natural and Super-natural, etc., quite unconscious, apparently, that as far as the rest of us are concerned, they are no longer valid currency. I am sure his answer was not intended to be dishonest, or frivolous, but that is the impression it gave to the ordinary man. I do not know whether Dr. Mascall himself believes the first chapters of Genesis to be historical. If he does he belongs to a rapidly dwindling remnant, even among "catholic" Christians. If he believes them to be "mythological", it is no good talking about them in the way that people did when they were accepted as historical. It requires a fair degree of sophistication to believe in an historical Redemption of a mythical Fall.

The neo-orthodox "Biblical Theologians" have not done much better. They either call Genesis "super-history", as if promoting it could make it more useful, or else like Dr. Hebert, who is saved from the higher nonsense by traditional English inhibitions, they try to imagine some primeval homo-sapiens making at some stage, a moral "fall" (perhaps using bad language when he hit his thumb with the first hammer, or something like that?). These biblical theologians represent an inevitable reaction against the superficial theories of sin put forward by some of the earlier liberal theologians. The idea that sin is just working out the tiger and the ape obviously fails to explain the radical evil that the twentieth century has experienced. But a real evolutionary theology recognises that with every stage of further complication, there are new and greater possibilities of both good and evil.

It is freedom that is the most astonishing single feature of the universe, and the special quality of man. But it is not some supernatural gift granted to him at some arbitrary stage—it can be traced back through all the most primitive forms of life, and back through them into the unpredictable behaviour of the raw materials of the universe. John Wren Lewis has done well to warn us against that

sort of fashionable "lifemanship" that tries to score points from fashionable scientific hypotheses, but this freedom is something that can be traced back as far as science has yet carried us, and can never again be denied. We can now see the joy and the glory of it, for how else could God have granted us freedom in its fullest depth? No longer do we need to try to bring him in as a *Deus ex machina* at arbitrary points, or relegate him to gaps in our scientific knowledge.

The freedom that has been built into the universe from the very beginning implies that at every stage "good" and "bad" choices can be made—those that lead, fruitfully, to monkeys, and to man; those that lead fruitlessly to brontosauruses; those that lead to parasites and diseases. The fact that disease and pain existed before man appeared on the earth is itself enough to dissolve several theories about the result of man's "fall", and without requiring the fall of "angels" to fill the gap.

Just as there is probably no visible break where we can say that man ceased to be a higher ape, and became a man, so there is no exact point where we can say that "poor choices" became conscious moral choices. It is obviously absurd to make moral judgements on parasites, and knowledge of our pre-history may make us more charitable in our human judgements. There is nothing that distinguishes Jesus more sharply from the rest of mankind, including churchmen, than his absolute refusal to make, or allow us to make, moral judgements on others. It is this refusal, so exasperating to the righteous, that is one of the main threads in the complex plot of His crucifixion.

It is this freedom which makes for the countless collisions in which we continually recrucify Christ in His brethren. It is only when we recognise Christ in the man who disagrees with us, the man who exasperates us, the enemy, the heretic, that we fully realise the meaning of the crucifixion, and our own daily share in its guilt.

In this confusing, complex, ever moving process by which God is creating us, we are continually using our freedom to act, and by every action, we set off an endless chain reaction into the future. Christ taught us how to start good chain reactions, by acts of selfless love, how to stop the disastrous consequences of bad ones by the miracle of forgiveness, a theme that has been excellently dealt with by Hannah Arendt in *The Human Condition*. Forgiveness is a miracle, interrupting the chain of cause and effect which governs

the world, but the sons of men *can* forgive. The idea that the church has a sort of monopoly of "forgiveness", and doles it out, obscures the real meaning of what Christ did and taught.

Jesus also gives us faith, a bridge across the chaotic processes of our making into eternity, a faith that means believing that his open, generous, defenceless self-giving is the right way to use our freedom, but it is no easy faith, with none of the comfort that seems somehow to have become associated with that word in its "religious" aspects.

These are some of the raw materials for a new book of Genesis, as one twentieth century agnostic Christian sees them. If he was a scientist or a theologian he would no doubt be able to see many more. We wait for some Poet-Scientist-Theologian to write the epic and fire our minds to build a new culture more glorious than the departed glory of "Christendom", which still tempts us to look back, but turns us into ecclesiastical pillars of salt if we do.

Comment

N.M. writes:

Will PRISM readers please try to see the review *Beyond the Fringe* at the Fortune Theatre? As well as being by far the best thing of its kind for years, it contains towards the end a skit on a sermon by Alan Bennett that should be compulsory for all ordinands and clergymen. It is hysterically funny, and yet could well be a real sermon. If heard in church, one would not laugh but just switch off as so often has to happen. The text is—"My brother Esau is a hairy man, but I am a smooth man"—one of those texts which seem to have nothing to do with what follows, but nevertheless to have some grisly psychological significance. Alan Bennett delivers the sermon deadpan with that combination of weird voice, surprising emphases, irrelevant quotations (from W. E. Henley) and common-touch slogans ("Life is like a tin of sardines: we are all of us looking for the key") that seems to take over when a preacher cares less about what he is saying than how he is saying it. It demonstrates more effectively than all the exhortations in PRISM the dangers of the let's-communicate-by-gimmicks school, as opposed to the more arduous school which says think what you're trying to say, and then say it straight.

Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned here, too, in the laughter being so stimulating and healthy and yet not what some PRISM readers might call constructive!

* * * *

At the other end of the scale PRISM readers might be interested to look at Genet's *The Blacks*, at the Royal Court Theatre (unless it is off by the time this appears in print, which will be a relief for them). This play contains a good deal of mockery of the Mass and of the Host; and in the last act there is a comic pantomime of a bishop being castrated on stage. The play was taken very seriously by the serious Sunday newspapers (it was mercilessly slaughtered by Bernard Levin in the *Daily Express*), and Sartre has described Genet as a Saint. Because it is obscure and is dolled out with masks and mime, this sort of play is seldom considered by Christians, who reserve their indignation for healthy romantic works like *Lady Chatterley*. But they should perhaps take a look at what is going on around them, if only to get Lawrence for instance in perspective. Genet is profoundly anti-Christian: he is reported to believe that the purpose of life is human degradation, and the noblest act a man can do is to betray his best friend to the police. With all this being taken religiously by a lot of intelligentsia, it might strike even members of the House of Lords that in such a *milieu* Lawrence is a breath of fresh air.

* * * *

The Editor writes:

In Nicholas Mosley's biography of Father Raynes reviewed elsewhere in this number there is a quotation from one of Father Raynes' addresses to the General Chapter of the Community of the Resurrection: "A Bishop is an authority to whom obedience is owed, yet it is obedience exacted according to rule, i.e. canonical obedience, rule to which he also submits. . . . Owing to present circumstances which produce a situation in which neither the Church nor the diocese have any effective voice in the choosing of the Bishop—and when the canons are disregarded, synods neglected, and the very law of the Church even in spiritual and liturgical matters subject to secular interference—priests have no certainty or guarantee of stability in the diocese and the oath of canonical obedience is robbed of much of its meaning, and there is not the

right obedience because there is not the mutual submission of one to another".

Until canon law is revised and accepted, there will never be the mutual obedience and trust which the Body of Christ demands of its members and which at present is so sadly lacking that priests claim the parson's freehold as a defence against other priests.

This should be the answer to those who, having always regarded canon revision as irrelevant, hope that the new Archbishop of Canterbury will quietly shelve it. Without a sound bone structure the spirit of a man is comparatively ineffectual; without a sound framework of law, the Church can have all the spiritual revivals she longs for, but they will be relatively ineffective. Just as the giving of calcium to ricketty children is as much God's work as "converting" them, so Canon Law Revision is as much God's work as "spiritual revival".

R.D. writes:

Lying in bed, angry, unshaven, scratching (I'd caught chicken pox from the children) I had a chance of hearing some religious programmes on the wireless, a thing one normally doesn't seem to do. There is a portentous series called "In search of the Truth", and there was a thoroughly energetic and reasonable evangelical brains trust debating "conversion". The only trouble seemed to come when Dr. Gordon Rupp, who spoke extremely good sense with the greatest diffidence, ventured to point out, in the over-emphasis on a personal act of the will, the danger of Pelagianism. Oh well, said the question-master roaring with laughter, we're all agreed that Pelagianism is a terrible danger. The audience laughed too, for a man who is prepared to talk theology and even use theological terms in a radio discussion must expect to be laughed at—the result being that Dr. Rupp retreated further into his shell. Could not the Christian Outlook team, who appear to handle the series, let Dr. Rupp and some other real theologians give us some real theology? We won't laugh, unless they do. In fact I think it would do everyone a power of good, and would incidentally demonstrate that we *have* got some theology.

R.D. writes:

A final piece of intolerable reminiscing from "our nauseating mutual admiration society": the publication of Nicholas Mosley's Life of Father Raynes marks the winding up of an operation which began, so far as I was concerned, in 1953 when I first wrote to Father

Huddleston in Johannesburg about his writing a book: well, *that* book was duly written and published. Through him I met Father Raynes, who made no bones at all about the plans he had for me, so when I wrote to ask if I should take on the job of running the Faith Press he said what are you waiting for? But it wasn't just books and pamphlets he wanted published, he wanted a job—a particular job—for Nicholas Mosley. He wanted him to edit an Anglican magazine. For this he required an Anglican magazine or some means of starting one. So we all met (dozens of high church clergymen with black suits and grey faces, talking—goodness, how they can talk!) and decided to have an Anglican magazine since we had an editor. (Nick took it all in good part). After that there were a lot of fruitless meetings, draft statements of non-existent policies about non-existent causes to be furthered by non-existent periodicals. At one time it looked as if the whole thing would fold, and it was then that I got a glimpse of the true effectiveness of Father Raynes. So long as other people were doing what he (and God) wanted, he was prepared to sit back, watchful, helpful, non-interfering. But when things started to go wrong he was in the office in no time at all, straightening it out, re-enthusing, making one feel one had no need to ask any questions, just get on with it. Then the original PRISM with its founders, Messrs. Martin and Minney, appeared; in some Lambeth digs, over hotpot, the first new-style PRISM ("What's wrong with the Church?" — sounds corny now, doesn't it?) was planned. Father Raynes read the proofs of that first number at Faith House not long before he died. He came into the office having been waylaid by a shop assistant who wanted to clear her mind about the seven deadly sins. "What on earth did you say?" I asked. "Well", rather diffidently, "I just said what they were". He took that first number on the chin, though I wondered, as I watched him reading it, what he was really thinking about. It didn't seem to be him really—but perhaps it was. He hardly lived to see the first number out, but he lived long enough to see his plan succeed—Nicholas Mosley *was* editing an Anglican journal: and by dying, Father Raynes gave him another job, writing his life story—which he has done, few people realise how superbly.

C.M. writes:

About a year ago, PRISM acknowledged its affiliation to the Mothers' Union, wayward sons of stalwart mothers. So when I

went to their recent meeting on Censorship in Films and Television, I sat (like Mary Plain) on my very bestest behaviour. No, I told myself firmly, you mustn't start drawing their hats; and whatever you say must be nice.

Anyway, there we all sat, on Windsor chairs in the M.U. basement, a phalanx of senior mums and a posse of hacks at the back. John Trevelyan, that man whose signature you see at the cinema under Morrison of Lambeth's, was talking about his job. Last time I'd come across him he'd made remarks like "we're paid to have dirty minds", and was busy being pilloried as an obscurantist. I suppose that is mostly how the poor man is looked upon by his critics, but he has learnt to combat it with a great deal of wit and good argument. So there he was talking, defending his cuts, and ready to answer charges of fuddy-duddyism.

But he had miscalculated his audience, When he had finished, and received a polite clap, the questions came pouring in. "Why wasn't Richard III made an X?" and "Why don't you have all-U programmes I can take my fourteen-year-old daughter to see?" and "Why do you leave shots of horses falling in Westerns?"

My feet, I found, had caught the rhythm, and were stamping in chorus:

"Mud, mud, glorious mud,
Nothing quite like it for cooling (heating?) the blood;
A regular army
Of hippopotami
Enjoying a wallow in glorious mud!"

So I'm being unfair, am I? Being clever, eh? Scoring cheap points off the grand old mums? I tell you, I'd gone determined to be nice, but I might just as well have strayed into a moot of the Anti-Violence League. In the same way that Trevelyan obviously did, I had expected some liberal, progressive sniping at the reactionary censor, from the new style Mothers' Union we've been learning to believe in. Not a bit of it. There they were, unwaveringly faithful to every shred of Mary Sumner's principles, or whatever. PRISM is far too naughty; it had better disaffiliate.

Eberhart Wedell writes:

I am reluctant to cross swords with my colleague Guthrie Moir: his contribution in the July issue does however call for further comment from me. If I may put my points in order:

1. Mr. Moir attributes to me the leadership of a "back to the parish" movement. As far as I am aware I am not leading anybody, flattering though the suggestion is.

2. As regards the theme of "back to the parish", again it would in some ways be pleasant to think that this was my main concern, since this would mean swimming with the mainstream of those who criticise the Church's central administration. My article in your March issue was however concerned with exactly the opposite: the failure to take the need for efficient central administration sufficiently seriously. I made it clear that I regard the failure to implement the courageous recommendations of the Ridley Committee as the real source of our present difficulties, and said (page 15)—"let us decide what it is that requires to be done by the Church centrally, and then will the manpower, authority and resources necessary to do it. Let all the rest be devolved on the local church and give it autonomy to set to work". The latter sentence was intended to indicate that I recognise a proper division of functions between Church House on the one hand, and the dioceses and parishes on the other.

3. Again, my point about the Church Information Board was not the one which Mr. Moir is apparently anxious to refute. It follows from what I have said that an efficient, well-staffed Information Board is essential to the Church's central machine. But this Board, like the other Boards and Councils of the Church Assembly, is an executive organ which can function effectively only if it is given a clear lead by the policy-making body. My doubt was, and remains, whether the Assembly has cleared its own mind about the theological nature of the Information enterprise. This in turn arises from the Church's understanding of its own *raison d'être*. Hence my plea for clear thinking about basic policy so that expensive executive organs may be well used. The Information Board was only an example. Any one of a number of other Assembly organs might have served equally well.

4. This will serve to show, I hope, that far from criticising the Information Board staff, I was pleading that they should be given the tools with which to do the job. (Incidentally, as a public servant myself, I am quite aware of what it is reasonable for public servants to put up with!)

Letters

FAITH AND ORDER

Sir,

Fr. Edwards talks of Bishops ruling: I talk of the sacramental liturgy of a Bishop. The two have gone together, and do go together, and do go together today—but they are not inseparable (cf. the position of Bishops in the Irish Celtic Church). To speak as though any controversy over Episcopacy is an argument about forms of government is to mistake the whole matter. Moreover, this has a bearing on the alleged offensiveness of the concept of invalidity. Fr. Edwards has said, when talking of sacramental validity in his original article "Christ is present in the non-episcopal churches. That's validity for me." But it cannot be said that a valid sacrament is so *because* it is spiritually edifying, nor that a priest is validly ordained *because* he benefits his flock: and this either was, or could be understood as, Fr. Edwards' meaning. In talking of orders, Bp. Kirk defined "valid" as meaning "entitled to anything which they claim." Now the orders of the sects are not the three-fold orders of the Catholic Church. Fr. Edwards admits this to be "imperfectly Catholic" because non-episcopal. But what does "imperfectly Catholic" mean in this context—that after subtracting the Bishop one still can maintain a Catholic priesthood and sacraments? This concept of imperfection seems nonsense to me—there is no Catholic order where there are not the Catholic orders and so I must use the concept of "invalidity."

As to the evidence of continuity between the Apostles and Bishops. The Apostolic Succession of Bishops can be defined in four ways: (*a*) They perform the same functions, or (*b*) their commission goes back to the apostles, or (*c*) they succeed one another in the same sees, the derivation of which may be traced back to the commission of the Apostles, or (*d*) through their consecration they receive the Holy Ghost, as the Apostles did, to empower them for their work. (I quote the same authority as Fr. Edwards, the "Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church"). Leaving aside the scriptural evidence for a moment, what do the Fathers say? Even the most rigid biblicist, who will allow no force to the traditions of the Fathers in disputes over doctrine, cannot object to the Fathers as witnesses of con-

temporary fact. None can doubt that St. Clement of Rome held a doctrine of succession from the Apostles, and even *if* he was not a contemporary he was among those who were, and were able to test the truth of his assertions (of the three aged Christians who were his messengers to Corinth I Clem.) In the Epistle to the Corinthians (c. 96 A.D.) he claims that the Apostles, after appointing these firstfruits as bishops and deacons, made a further provision that if they should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed to their liturgy. Whether "their" applies to the Apostles, or to the Bishops and Deacons may be controverted—but there can be little dispute concerning the phrase "those who were appointed by them (the Apostles) or by other ἐλλογιμων'ανδρων afterwards" Ελλογιμος is used three times elsewhere in the epistles in its primary sense of "enrolled" or "on our account"—so one might here translate "others accounted with the apostles." But whatever the translation, it appears that there were others, not Apostles, who later appointed ἐπισκοποι and διακουοι as the Apostles had done, and by their injunction—which looks like succession in senses (*a*) and (*b*)—in agreement with the situation is the Pastorals especially Titus 1-5 (1 Tim. 3).

St. Ignatius' evidence about the episcopate is not confined to his own Asia Minor, as Fr. Edwards suggests. He claims that they have been appointed throughout the world (οἱ κατα τερατα οριѕΘεντες) by the will of Jesus Christ, and that they are the appointed focus of unity. By his evidence non-episcopacy is the norm in 116 A.D. This seems to be succession in sense (*a*) and lends support to sense (*b*). Incidentally, Ignatius stresses the position of the Bishop in regard to the Sacraments "Let that Eucharist be considered valid which is under the Bishop, or him to whom he commits it" (to the Smyrnaeans VIII) and shows the importance of the Bishop as president—in line with Acts 20.11—in which St. Paul fulfills the injunction to the Apostles in Luke 22.19 and I Cor. 11.24 to celebrate the Eucharist.

The concept of succession in sense (*c*) appears as St. Ignatius, who claims (rashly if Fr. Edwards is correct) to be able "to enumerate those who were by the Apostles instituted Bishops in the churches and the succession of these Bishops to our own time"—and does so for Rome. And this is an argument against heretics who do not question the fact, but claim a rival prophetic succession. Erhardt has given much study to these succession lists, and shows the importance of the Jerusalem Church, which is reflected in the Eusebian lists which trace succession from St. James (see Acts 15 where St.

James appears to be a Christian High Priest surrounded by his sanhedrin of Presbyters).

It is rash to challenge the witness of Catholic antiquity: it is doubly rash to do so against the evidence. In the Scriptures one finds the Apostolic ministry: in the second century one finds these powers exercised by those who claim to be their successors, the Bishops. The evidence suggests that the truest solution is to grant them what they claim.

Yours sincerely,

Sunderland. T. J. Towers.

Dear Sir,

Mr. David L. Edwards' letter is an example of the mistaken view among ecumenists that the apparent gap between the Apostles and the first known representatives of the monarchical episcopate is relevant to modern discussions of union.

About those early days the following must be assumed true unless there is evidence to the contrary:

1. The shape of the Church's ministry, while very "plastic," changed everywhere by universal consent without schism or violent discontinuity.
2. There was no change, in that period, of the primary functions of the major order, i.e. of celebrating the Eucharist and of commissioning others to act in the Name of the Ascended Christ.
3. The altering shape of the Church's ministry was not then occasioned by factors which also were the occasion of theological and of doctrinal cleavages.
4. The existing unity of the Christian economy of Grace was not called in question.

The above considerations surely discourage us from seeking very early precedent in ecumenical activity. If, however, I seem hypercritical of the Ecumenical movement, I should like to make the positive suggestion that all the major Christian bodies, including the Roman Catholic, should attempt a concordat on the minimum requirements for the theology and administration of Holy Baptism, so that at least we know that we are all Catholics, at least as individuals.

Yours sincerely,

Newcastle upon Tyne. John G. Lovejoy.

Dear Sir,

I agree with Mr. Bryan that we Romans should and will confess out imperfection and atone for our responsibility for Christian disunity. The smug view, expressed or implied, that Rome has nothing to learn from other Churches, cannot cause him as much pain as it causes us. But I doubt whether "the laying on of hands" (by which he does not appear to mean Ordination) is a necessary means of restoring the Church's fullness. Surely that grace will come only with tolerance prayer, and unlimited time.,

By contrast, the Anglo-Scottish and Lanka discussions have given a terrible urgency to the question of the Apostolical Succession within the Anglican Communion. Of course all Anglicans know that "they are already part of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church." But don't these discussions illustrate that Reunion depends not on our beliefs about ourselves but our beliefs, however misguided, about each other? If the view were held that Anglican orders were valid and Roman not, Reordination all round would doubtless be the answer. While there is a regrettably widepsread belief in the Roman and Orthodox Churches that something is amiss with Anglican Orders, something must be done to remove the causes of this doubt, before the other Reunionist movements get under way.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN FLETCHER.

S.W.1.

Sir,

A group of your less instructed readers would wish to ask two questions of those who have recently written to you on the subject of Reunion.

1. What evidence is there that the Incarnate Christos "founded" a Church? We have always understood that the Ecclesia was the work of Moses, Abraham, Noah and Co.; and further that the Christ was born in His Church.
2. Are we supposed to equate the Church with the Kingdom of God? If so, what is the object of having two expressions for the same institution? If not, what are the relations of the two?

Your obedient servant

JOHN UPCOTT.

Newbury.

Dear Sir,

Mr. Cracknell's letter, with much of which I agree, contains a number of assumptions which need I think much more detailed examination. I quote two passages:

1. "One of the things he did was to beget the Church, His Mystical Body, when the soldier slashed His side and 'forthwith came there out blood and water'."

(*a*) This identification of the moment of creation of the Church with the manifestation of the death of Christ ignores other aspects of biblical doctrine such as the Church as the elect people of God (under the Old as well as the New Covenant); as the "Body of Christ" which of course began at the Incarnation; as the Spirit-filled organism manifested as Pentecost.

(*b*) It assumes that the Church was founded *by* our Lord, as does (regrettably) the couplet of the hymn "She is his new creation by water and the word." Scripture and the Creeds teach rather that the Son of God neither "begets" nor "creates", that being the work of God the Father. It is to the Father that the collects of the Prayer Book attribute the foundation of the Church (see that for SS. Simon and Jude).

2. "It is therefore in this that 'Romans' and 'Anglicans' differ, that 'Romans' believe that our Lord founded a "*Church*" (One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic) and this, being among men, is something visible and concrete; whereas Anglicans and Protestants do *not* believe in *the* Church in this way."

The following assumptions need looking at:

(*a*) That Anglicans, in spite of the creeds, do not believe that the Church is One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic.

(*b*) That there is an official and standard Roman Catholic doctrine of the Church. In fact, one is told this is to be considered at the forthcoming Council.

(*c*) That the Church of England does *not* regard the Church as "visible and concrete". But compare the Nineteenth Article of Religion.

(*d*) That "Anglicans" and "Protestants" hold common doctrine on the Church. An examination of Lutheran and Calvinist teaching on this point would reveal wide divergencies both between themselves and with us.

No doubt Mr. Cracknell would have clarified much of this if he had had more space available. But his letter as it stands could easily give rise to grave and important misconceptions.

I am, Sir, yours sincerely,

ROBERT PETITPIERRE, O.S.B.

Nashdom Abbey.

Dear Sir,

I do not think that Mr. David Edwards is quite sound when he suggests that episcopacy ruling the presbyterate emerged after the death of the apostles. It is best to regard apostolical succession and the authority given to the apostles as exemplified in their actions.

We find in Acts that St. Matthias was elected to fill the "office of oversight" left vacant by the suicide of Judas (Acts, i, 20). If we accept the truthfulness of the primitive narrative at the beginning of Acts we cannot account for the position of the apostles without recognising that they had a distinct governing office. They appear in Acts not only as the nucleus but also as the teachers and directors of the new society. The society "continued steadfastly in the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and the prayers" (Acts ii, 42). The Church recognised that the apostles had the presence of Christ with them in teaching, in disciplinary legislation, and in worship, with which three functions the Synoptic Gospels connect the promise of that presence. St. Peter and the other apostles claimed to be the witnesses of Christ. They taught both the Christians and the Jews, they administered the fund of the community, they formed a company of their own distinct from the multitude of believers (Acts iv. 23, 32; cf. xv. 22). In the case of Ananias and Sapphira, St. Peter exercised the office of judge, to the fear of the Church. He performed this solemn work without a commission from the Church.

A devolution of apostolical authority became necessary. The apostles could not by themselves perform the whole work of the ministry. Seven new officers were appointed for charity organisation. They received no commission from the community as a whole. The community chose them, but the apostles appointed them, and they did it by the laying on of hands (Acts vi. 3-6). Both in this instance and in others the relation of the Seven to the Twelve was distinctly that of subordinates to superiors. St. Stephen and St. Philip, though primarily appointed to superintend the alms of the

Church, worked miracles and preached the Gospel, and St. Philip baptised and spoke under direct inspiration. But St. Philip, in spite of his great gifts, could not convey the Holy Spirit to the baptised. The believers of Samaria had to be confirmed by the apostles themselves (Acts viii. 15 sqq.). Throughout the early chapters of Acts we find that the apostles did not make a mere claim to be respected, but assumed that they had a right to be obeyed.

The same principle applied to the Church in Antioch when, after St. Philip had gone there as an evangelist, the apostles immediately established a connexion with Antioch by sending St. Barnabas thither whose exhortations were accepted by the disciples there. They also acknowledged that the Church at Jerusalem contained definite rulers (Acts xi. 30). Again when the apostles and presbyters at Jerusalem acted together to preserve the unity of the Church when the question arose about the circumcision of Gentile converts directions were sent to the Gentile Christians in the name of the apostles and the presbyter brethren. It was because the Church at Jerusalem contained the apostles at the time of the Council that it was able to issue authoritative advice to the Church in Antioch, which was, we must remember, a most important city.

Apostolical succession is a fact from the foundation of the Catholic Church—indeed, it is the security for the valid administration of the Church and sacraments. It represents the care of the Holy Spirit who inhabits the Church. It is part of our Lord's plan for the furtherance of His kingdom. We have no security that we really receive certain gifts of God unless we avail ourselves of a ministry founded on this principle. Without this ministry we cannot be certain that we received the gift of the Holy Spirit in confirmation, or the gift of Christ's Body and Blood in Holy Communion or the remission of sins. Indeed the truth or falsehood of apostolical succession is bound up with the sacramental system—but if I proceed to develop that line of thought this already too long letter would exceed all proportion.

Yours faithfully,
ANTHONY SYMONDSON.

S.W.1.

SOCIOLOGY

Dear Sir,

Whilst not denying the need for a Christian critique of society allong the lines of Mr. Mairet's and Mr. Reckitt's discussion, may

I make a plea for more of the other kind of sociology as exemplified by Fr. Harman's account of Boulard's and Argyle's books.

To begin with, we cannot make accurate and worthwhile evaluations of society until we have a complete and straightforward description of what we are trying to evaluate. This means the preliminary hard work of careful, meticulous, comprehensive and detailed observations, and the testing of hypotheses derived from them by further observation and experiment. The chances of arriving at valid results without them are shown by Mr. Rolfe's article. I have no idea exactly what evidence he possesses of the individual and social life of town dwellers from which to draw conclusions about the "normal and approved form of family habitation," but whatever it is does not appear in his article. "Suspicions" about the incidence of poliomyelitis, delinquency, and neurosis among handy men and gardeners can certainly not be regarded as acceptable. In the absence of reliable evidence how can he expect anyone to take him seriously?

Apart from the need to avoid this kind of specious reasoning, sociological and psychological research can be useful for more immediate reasons. Looking at any estimate of religious vitality in this country one cannot deny that the Church's witness should be made more effective, and the problem of how to preach the Gospel to those who cannot or will not listen is one crying out for scientific research. At the moment, for our solution, we must look to the prejudices, preconceptions and circumscribed experiences of anyone who cares to pontificate on the matter, but this is inexcusable when the methods and techniques of the social sciences are available for our use. Boulard and Argyle have shown how the problem can be tackled by more reliable means than the hit and miss of individual experience. The studies that they describe are only a beginning—and not above criticism—but they show how our knowledge can be extended with certainty and precision. With this knowledge we shall make a much more successful attempt to adapt our strategy, tactics and techniques to the needs of the situation.

One must avoid, of course, a too naïve attitude towards sociological research. Fr. Harman gives the impression that all we need to know is the age, sex, occupation and politics of the faithful. Presumably the next step would be to give us jobs of the appropriate category, and to recruit us to the right political party, for us all to become Christian. (Changing the age and sex of the unconverted

clearly presents greater problems.) Alternatively we could concentrate our efforts on those already in the correct sociological groupings, get a hundred per cent response there, and leave the rest to perdition. In fact acquiring this information is only a preamble to the real business of study and investigation. If people of certain occupational and political groups tend to be irreligious why is this—how do they differ from those in other groups? Is it something about themselves or their social conditions? What about the first groups who are not irreligious, and those in the other groups who are—what is special about them? Could it be something about the way the Gospel is preached, the image that the Church presents to them? Perhaps it is here that we should look for the solution, for we certainly cannot change sex, from Argyle's observation that among Orthodox worshippers the sex ratio customary in this country is reversed, it might not be necessary.

Yours sincerely,
LESLIE BUCK.

Dear Sir,

I am surprised that there is no letter of protest in your latest issue about your use of the phrase "Christian Sociology" as the title of your June issue.

Although still in its very early stages, sociology is a science because it is an attempt to apply the scientific method to a study of society. The phrase "Christian Sociology" is therefore as meaningless as "Christian Physics" or "Christian Biology".

There is however a part of Sociology which is commonly referred to as the Sociology of Religion. This is a study of that part of society which has to do with religious organisations and with religious attitudes and beliefs. It is carried out by sociologists who may or may not be Christians, and its value will naturally depend on the ability of the sociologists and not their beliefs. Individual Christians are free to make what use they like of the findings in this field, but by doing so they cannot lay claim to the meaningless title of "Christian Sociologists".

The important task, for Christians, is to encourage much more work in this field by the best available sociologists.

Yours faithfully,
MARCH.

Rugby.

INDUSTRY

Dear Sir,

If I may be allowed to answer Mr. Minney's criticism of my letter in the January number I shall be grateful, for the points of difference between us amount to very important differences in the theology of this world. This is a part of our theology that until recently has not since the Fathers received much attention, and now is vitally important.

We begin with different emphasis. He equates what I said about industry, science, commerce etc., particularly with the bad and soul destroying elements in it, and then contrasts God in a factory unfavourably with God in an agricultural setting. There is a bias here. I have known a bad farmer befoul his whole farm including his animals. And what about "*Wuthering Heights*?" And surely there is a real romance in research, invention and administration, and even in the intense personal relationships of the factory floor? At any rate there never has been any lack of country people ready to desert the agricultural setting for that of industry.

Again he assumes that God is interested in quality rather than the quantity of souls in the world. Why not both? The same attitude is implied in his interpretation of the parable of the talents. Why should God not be interested in the right use of both our human talents and our money, which are both gifts for our use? We are all sinners and all potentially redeemable by Christ—the Dives who is prepared to *risk* his money that others may have employment, and the Lazarus who "loses his identity in industry." I wonder if he ever had the sort of identity Mr. Minney supposes?

I fear that in all this there lies an all too common aversion to what has come out of the industrial revolution. Rather we should regard these things as growing pains, initiated by the Incarnation as steps in bringing this world, and possibly not too far hence other worlds, into subjection for God. The more responsible we encourage industrialisation and all that goes with it to be to the overall plan of God the better. In this sense we ask it to renounce the world, the flesh and devil, and so baptise it. Automation is one such act of responsibility which will free many men from repetitive and unskilled jobs. And here in the Transvaal we have an illustration of industry bringing about integration between the black and white races at a pace many times that found in a purely agricultural setting.

This is half our trouble in S. Africa. And it is again a growing pain in what must surely be part of God's overall plan—a true multi-racial society of all His children.

We both agree that industrialisation is a risk we ought to take. Such a risk I prefer to call growing pains, because the God I know is for ever taking calculated risks and enjoying it. Baptising industry, etc. means we learn to co-operate also and enjoy it.

Yours sincerely,

IAN R. CARRICK.

WAKEFIELD MYSTERY PLAYS

Dear Sir,

Although the Wakefield mystery plays have by now finished their run at the Mermaid Theatre, I cannot let Mr. Malet's "criticism" of them in the June issue of PRISM go unchallenged. As a pocket-sized personal impression his remarks perhaps have their value, but as criticism they appear to me unconstructive and mainly off the point.

He admits, certainly, that the audience must use its imagination when watching these plays, but it is unfortunate that Mr. Malet did not direct his imagination via his programme notes: mediaeval mystery plays were performed out-of-doors, on a succession of "pageant-carts," and therefore his vision of banqueting halls and roast boars' heads distorts his mental view-point. The mystery plays were considered not a mere divertisement to amuse the barons while they littered the rushes with chewed bones: they were a serious attempt to bring to the ordinary people the realities of the Christian faith—just as drama is being used in youth clubs today. Perhaps if Mr. Malet had recognised this he would have been more impressed by the scenes from the New Testament, particularly the Raising of Lazarus. Possibly I lack twentieth-century hard-headedness and sophistication, but I found the appeal of the risen "skeleton" extremely telling—unpolished un-subtle, over-long though it was.

Mr. Malet complains bitterly about the representation of Christ, and certainly James Bolan was not a commanding figure of divine power and majesty. But the New Testament scenes in which he appeared demanded not Christ as God but Christ as man: Christ receiving baptism from John, Christ taxing his human body to the utmost in the exertion of divine power for the raising of Lazarus,

Christ eating with his disciples, Christ scourged and crucified. No actor, of course, could fulfil everyone's idea of Christ, but it seemed to me that James Bolan depicted very movingly the humanity of the Son.

Finally I should like to suggest that more imagination is required in viewing the mystery plays than the conjuring up of the mediaeval scene or the ability to accept the product of Noah's "Do-it-yourself" boat kit as the ark. The audience must be prepared to shed the hypercritical objective attitude of the theatre-goer today, and regard the plays, as they were originally seen, as a lively sharing of faith which demands sympathetic participation on the part of the audience. Viewed in this way deficiencies of both writing and acting are unimportant, and only by this means can the plays make their full impact as entertainment, teaching and praise.

Yours faithfully,

SUSAN B. AINSWORTH.

London, W.C.1.

OUR GOD IS TOO . . .?

Dear Sir,

David Nicholls is mistaken about what Christianity essentially is, as distinct from its many forms of expression. How else could he make the ludicrous statement that it is the job of the Church (or the church) ". . . to encourage and develop the pious feelings of its members"? The job of the Church is the redemption of fallen human nature, including that human nature's "pious feelings," which are as much in need of redemption as man's other thoughts and feelings. It is not what Christians do which distinguishes them from non-Christians, but what God does for, in, and through them.

However, without agreeing either with Mr. Nicholls' diagnosis or his proposed cure, we can share his dissatisfaction. Those who are looking for they know not what are unlikely to find much satisfaction in many of our parish churches. But the important thing for the Church to tell them is that what they want is not religion but God. Religion, after all, is only a means to an end.

Yours etc.,

C. M. PAULL.

S.W.11.

CATHEDRALS

Dear Sir,

I would suggest Mr. Brian Williams visits some cathedrals in the Northern Province then perhaps he would not make such sweeping and untrue statements about cathedrals.

Newcastle Cathedral has for many years had a Parish Communion in which all can and do join, Ripon has for some years also had a Parish Communion sung by live people and given a lead to country parishes, Wakefield and Chester are two worshipping centres of communities and at York on some Holy Days the congregation sing a simple Sung Mass. Sheffield which I have only visited once seemed to me much alive and in touch with the work of the community it serves. I expect Blackburn and Bradford would have the same story to tell.

Yours faithfully,
EDWARD HARDMAN.

Nyasaland.

CORRECTION

Dear Sir,

There are two rather surprising mistakes in your little collection of sayings of Father Raynes, culled from Mr. Mosley's new book. Both the third ("It is barely possible to combine the activities of being a good Christian and a good Bishop") and the fourth ("The Church of England is an ingeniously devised instrumentality for defeating the objects it is meant to promote") are quoted by Mr. Mosley on page 35 of his book from Bishop Gore.

Yours faithfully,
MARTIN WILLIAMS.

Birmingham.

[*Sorry!*—ED.]

Dear Sir,

Must we have the "poems?"

Yours faithfully,
ANN E. HINCH.

[*Yes.—Ed.*]

Reviews

LIFE AGAINST DEATH. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 30s.

It is likely to come as a surprise to most churchmen to hear Freud described as a puritan, and an even greater shock to hear that psychoanalysis needs to turn to Christianity to overcome the defects that arise from its puritanism. Yet this is the argument advanced, in all seriousness, by Norman O. Brown, Professor of Classics at the Wesleyan University in the United States, in his book.

Since it is not necessary to agree with a book in order to regard it as important, I have no hesitation in commending this work as epoch-making, although it will probably seem shocking, perhaps even disgusting, to many churchpeople, at any rate at first reading. It may well prove as important for the general climate of opinion in the second half of the twentieth century as Freud's own work was in the first, although so far it has attracted only a moderate amount of attention from the reviewers.

Its theme is to some extent indicated by its sub-title, *The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History*, but it is much more than a straightforward attempt to apply psychoanalytical concepts to the understanding of historical movements, such as has been undertaken by, for example, Gordon Rattray Taylor in his *Sex in History*.

Professor Brown actually undertakes a complete reformulation of psychoanalysis itself, which he maintains has been half-hearted in following out its own insights, because it has failed to allow for the extent to which its theories have been influenced by the puritan-rationalist culture in which it has arisen. His starting-point is the dilemma at which Freud arrived near the end of his life in his book *Civilisation and its Discontents*. In this book, Freud argued that civilisation is impossible without considerable repression of the instincts, yet such repression only breeds neuroses—particularly social neuroses like aggressive wars—which in the end destroy civilisation. This despair, Professor Brown shows, is the real logical conclusion of psychoanalytical ideas as at present formulated, far more logical than the more optimistic note struck in Freud's earlier work or in the work of most of his followers. Is there any escape from it, he asks, or must we conclude, with Nietzsche, that man is merely a disease in the world?

He refuses to accept any easy answer based on such notions as "sublimation", which really only dodge Freud's logic. For this reason he has no truck with conventional religion, but he holds that at the heart of Christianity there lies a claim which conventional religion distorts out of all recognition, but which actually provides the only possible hope, namely, the claim that the human body itself can be changed *so that repression can be completely done away with.*

Freud failed to consider this possibility, Professor Brown holds, largely because his own unanalysed puritanism insisted on identifying civilised human life with the life of the rational adult as we know him, and so could not envisage a society based on the pure "erotic exuberance" characteristic of the tiny baby whose pleasure-seeking instincts have not yet become canalised into patterns designed to secure reproduction and survival.

Professor Brown reminds us that for Freud, the sexuality in terms of which all life was interpreted was not primarily a genital instinct, but rather the basic urge towards pleasure and play which initially infuses the whole body, and only later becomes localised in the reproductive organs, *by which time neurotic conflict has already set in.* What Freud could not envisage was the reversal of this process, but this, Professor Brown argues, is exactly what religion does envisage when it speaks of the resurrection of the body from bondage to sin and death into a state where it is wholly expressive of the joy of love.

This concept will startle most ordinary Christian readers, perhaps even Prismatic ones, but I would urge them not to reject it out of hand. I believe Professor Brown is pointing to an extremely important aspect of Christian truth which has been almost forgotten by the theologians. True, in recent years there has been an increasing emphasis in theology on the doctrine of incarnation, and the Bishop of Woolwich, Dr. J. A. T. Robinson, has published a most illuminating study showing that the whole Christian Gospel is really about *bodies*—the "body of sin" and the "body of the resurrection", both being understood as physical-social expressions rather than mere metaphors. But to take this basic Christian idea really seriously the insights of psychoanalysis are really essential—not the expurgated psychoanalysis of popular text-books, but the really down-to-earth psychoanalysis of Freud himself, with all its emphasis on "sordid facts of life".

The interesting thing is, as Professor Brown shows, that if we read great Christian writers like Luther in unexpurgated editions, we shall find that they can give Freud points any day in this emphasis on sordid phsyical facts. They even anticipate him in the insight that most of our culture, its highest aspects as well as its lowest, really derive from these sordid facts of life. What they hold out over Freud is the belief that the whole body can be redeemed to perfection, and I am sure Professor Brown is quite right in holding that if modern Christianity could recover *this* faith it would indeed have a Gospel for the modern world—the only sort of Gospel which a post-Freudian age could possibly find convincing.

Where I personally find that the book falls down is that it is not precise enough about just what the concept of resurrection might be expected to mean. To a large extent, of course, vagueness is unavoidable on this point, but Professor Brown seems to me to become unnecessarily vague at a stage where it is almost fatal to his argument.

For example, it is quite clear that he does not mean to allow the resurrection of the body to remain a mere hope for "the last day", on the other side of death. That would be to dodge the essential physical challenge of the doctrine altogether, and the New Testament itself insists that the risen life is something to be known *now*, at least in its first stages. But in that case just *how* does the resurrection-process take effect, and what does it consist of, in down-to-earth physical terms?

At times Professor Brown writes like a more conventional psychoanalyst, as if he rejected the whole idea of the supernatural as just one of the illusions of sublimation, and were solely concerned with recovering the instinctual spontaneity of animal life, but this would seem to me to be dodging the issue altogether. Repression may be a disease, but its very occurrence is indicative of some urge in human nature to rise above the animal level. To treat resurrection as a mere symbol for the recovery of instinctual spontaneity would be to lose the whole value of Professor Brown's argument, for there would then still be no answer to Freud's dilemma—civilisation would still be a mistake.

There must be a *real* transformation of physical life if there *is* to be any Good News, and for most of the time Professor Brown seems quite clear on this score—but he shies away from facing the implications at crucial points. For instance, he has relatively little to

say about science and technology, and in what he does say he tends to take the view, already urged on us by some Continental thinkers, that science is all part of the puritan-rationalist movement and as such part of the anal neurosis we have to overcome. Now while there is something in this—the harshness of some scientific materialism can certainly be explained in this way—the fact remains that science and technology do in fact enable us to change physical life.

I have myself argued[1] that the most important thing about the scientific age may be the feeling people in general have that physical life need not be unpleasant, or be vitiated by ugliness and decay, because we have the power to manipulate nature: hence our age may really be able to transcend puritanism without sacrificing sensitivity, and the romantic impulse can flower without turning into the romantic agony. This would probably strike Professor C. S. Lewis as the philosophy of Belbury, but anyone who is prepared even to consider Professor Brown's thesis ought, it seems to me, to be prepared also to take science and technology seriously in some such positive way as this, as being themselves contributory factors in the process of redeeming the physical. My own belief is that the scientific revolution was itself an indirect product of the resurrection-faith of Christianity, as regular readers of PRISM will know.

Of course, technology, like patriotism, is certainly not enough. Applied science may do much to make the physical world a place in which feelings can find positive satisfaction in joy and beauty, instead of having to be repressed, but in the end of the day there is still the last enemy which science cannot destroy, and moreover science can do nothing to prevent men using their freedom to make the physical world a hell rather than a heaven. A genuine resurrection-faith has to look to some much more radical transformation than is possible by scientific manipulation, and at this point too Professor Brown becomes vague just where he might be expected to be most interesting.

He has a good deal to say about the relationship between repression and fear of death, but what precisely he concludes from it is not clear: it *seems* as if he is merely proposing willingness to accept death as the solution, but this would seem to me to be another case of dodging the issue. Surely fear of death, like repression,

[1]. In a Third Programme talk entitled "A Vindication of Romance", published in *The Listener* for 1st October, 1959.

indicates something vital about human nature, however bad it may be in itself, and a genuine resurrection-faith would have to say something real and concrete about overcoming death itself, as well as fear of death. I would agree with Professor Brown that the idea of non-physical immortality is merely an escape from the problem, not a solution of it, but I see no reason why we should not believe in a full-blooded doctrine of physical resurrection.

The more science investigates physiology, the more likely it becomes, it seems to me, that the well-being of the physical body is a function of the degree to which the person is open to love—in which case Christians, who believe that God is love, can certainly see grounds for holding that a Man who never failed to live from God might well find that his physical well-being could be restored even through the shock of death. And the more science investigates physics, the more likely it becomes, I believe, that the forms and laws of matter are a function of the type of communication that is established between persons in their physical life—in which case the New Testament idea of a complete transformation of the physical world becomes credible, even if it still requires a tremendous act of faith to believe that it will happen.

If Professor Brown had been prepared to go as far as this I think his book would have been a lot more convincing than it is. Perhaps all the criticisms I have made can be boiled down to one—namely, that although his avowed objective is to rescue psychoanalysis from the *impasse* into which it was led by Freud's unanalysed puritanism, he does not take his own proposal quite seriously enough. What his argument really points towards, at every stage, is the need to rescue psychology from enslavement to the categories of biology. This does not in the least mean a lessening of emphasis on the physical: it means a recognition that in human life the physical need not be tied down to the purely organic.

Such a recognition, which from the point of view of abstract logic is the essence of the message of the Incarnation ("taking manhood into God"), makes it possible to recognise just *how* human life is "higher" than purely animal life. It is higher by virtue of the fact that people can form relationships with one another which involve affirmation of each other's value as independent individuals —i.e., distinctively personal relationships. (A contributor to PRISM recently tossed off the criticism of me that the divine is found "not just in personal relationships, as John Wren-Lewis keeps

saying, but in all activities", or words to that effect. The word "just" here appals me, but nevertheless I don't for a moment deny that all activities can partake of the divine—what I insist is that it is in personal relationship that man's distinctive character is realised, and if all activities *can* partake of the divine it is precisely because personal relationships suffuse them).

The fulfilment of human physical life comes in "erotic exuberance" indeed, but not *just* towards the environment in general we fulfil our physical natures by taking up all things into the life of really human relationship. If Professor Brown had recognised *this*, he would have been able to give a much more concrete account of what is involved in the resurrection of the body, and, even more important, he would have been able to give a much clearer indication than he does of how, in practical terms, it is to be brought about. All he in fact can come down to, in his final chapter, is a plea for "a little more eros" in our culture. I am by no means unsympathetic to this —up with Lady C!—but it is not the radical solution Professor Brown himself has led us to expect. A genuinely religious or personal analysis of the human situation, however, would have indicated the answer which Christianity in fact gives—the establishment of personal relationships on a new basis through forgiveness.

But having said all this, the fact remains that Professor Brown's book is of enormous value and should be required reading for all theologians. It takes genius to assert that the solution to the problem of repression lies in the possibility of resurrection of the body, even though it may seem obvious afterwards, and this is indeed an insight which the Church today needs perhaps more than anything else.

JOHN WREN-LEWIS

THE LIFE OF RAYMOND RAYNES by *Nicholas Mosley*, Faith Press. 25s.

THE FAITH by *Raymond Raynes*, C.R., edited by *Nicholas Mosley*. Faith Press. 5s.

The author of a full-scale biography has an impossible task since he has to describe as many facets as a man has, and the greater the man, the more these will be. In dealing with Father Raynes, Nicholas Mosley has to deal with biographical background, South Africa, C.S.I., the Community, the last years and Father Raynes' character.

Nick Mosley does it all well. One can pick minor faults. He tries hard but he cannot quite make us see as one and the same person, the man who converted Nick himself and countless others with charm and holiness and the man who after he had ceased to be Superior of the Community used to sit "alone and hunched at one of the lower tables in the refectory" and was "oppressed by gibbering ghosts and devils and in the dark." This is partly of course due to the *reader's* desire to have his hero a whole hero without spot, but it is also, one suspects, due to the author's reticence in talking about other members of the Community still alive. If we were given more of the Community background we would understand more of the man.

Father Raynes' writing and speeches do not impress one in the biography but in "The Faith," a record of one of his last missions, held in Denver, Colorado, we have a wonderful book. I wonder if the publishers have yet tumbled to the fact that this exposition of the Church's teaching put over with real power and humour, is the best *confirmation manual* published in recent years.

In the biography the African portion is the most exciting but its great gift is to make Father Raynes himself come alive together with the secret of his influence. As his successor at Sophiatown wrote "In the end, it wasn't brick and mortar; it wasn't the creation of a wonderful harmonious team of missionary workers; it wasn't even the blazing new trail in African missionary endeavour which was Raymond's greatest achievement. It was the showing-forth under exacting, immensely demanding and costly conditions, of the Religious Life itself. "This is what Father Raynes succeeded in doing, and it is what Nicholas Mosley has succeeded in doing too in this brilliant, immensely readable, but (alas) rather expensive book.

T.W.B.

Church Assembly 3-7 July

The summer session always includes the Budget and whenever money is discussed in the Assembly there is a full and attentive House, and a ready flow of speakers to warn us that if expenditure continues to rise some dioceses will have to default on their quotas. if this happens the blame will rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Assembly. The point was well made in a later debate by the Bishop of Grimsby who said that, "we are called on to see that church money is so well used that it is a pleasure to provide it". I would take the argument a stage further and say that we are called on to make known throughout the Church that the money is so well spent, etc. The Assembly is especially vulnerable on that section of the money (nearly one third of its total budget) which is spent on Central Government and Administration. Its own debates are too long, and it has a decided fondness for appointing commissions to shelve difficult problems rather than solve them. But the remaining two thirds is entirely justifiable and should, in fact, be increased. If the 735 members of the Assembly set themselves to broadcast this fact in their dioceses, we should hear much less nonsense about unpayable quotas. Nor, may I add, can this responsibility be shuffled off on the shoulders of the Church Information Office. One or two members made themselves ridiculous by trying to blame this organisation for inadequate, or faulty press coverage of the Assembly. As any journalist knows, the Church Information Office has worked wonders in the last year or two in securing good and fair press coverage for the Church as a whole. It cannot, however, work with inadequate material and at present the Assembly is just that.

The remark of the Bishop of Grimsby quoted above was during the debate on Redundant Churches held with a view to drafting a Measure for a later session. The main principle at issue was the morality of spending church money on buildings that are no longer required for worship but are of definite artistic merit. The present suggestion is that it would be wrong and stupid for the Church to allow beautiful (if unneeded) buildings on her care to decay, and that unless the Church is prepared to spend some money on them it is not reasonable to expect any help from the State. They are really two separate issues here. First there is the morality of spending church money on museum keeping, and secondly there is the practical question of how to obtain State aid. It is hardly

necessary to say that the first is the more important, and mercifully little stress was laid on the second in the Assembly. Museum keeping is a tendentious phrase, but I think it is probably an accurate one. We keep other museums for the researches of the expert and for the general education of the public. In exactly the same way it is not unreasonable to support a few outstanding if apparently unneeded churches in the hope that God may use their beauty to bring men to Him? Canon R. L. Hussey (Manchester) described this whole scheme to deal with Redundant Churches as "sanctified common sense". Provided it is kept at that level and not too much notice is taken in its operation of experts who wish to preserve unique Victorian rood-screens, then surely the Assembly was right to accept it by a large majority?

Having spent several hours on Redundant Churches, we had to squeeze the Report of the Board for Social Responsibility into the tail end of Thursday and a thinly attended session on Friday morning. This itself is a deplorable commentary in the Assembly's sense of priorities. Some attempt was made to blame this arrangement of the timetable on the Standing Committee, but no member of the Assembly had earlier suggested that it should be altered. It would, of course, be nice to feel that the empty benches on Friday morning were an expression of censure on the Report. Even if this were probable it would be quite inadequate. At present the Board is like a good feather mattress. It can be punched or pushed about, but little impression is apparently made.

There were two reasons for the sense of frustration that permeated this debate, the first being the presentation of the Board's case by its Chairman the Bishop of Leicester. He began by commenting that as he was only recently appointed he had signed but not written the Report. He said that he fully accepted responsibility for it, but inevitably the remark left a slight sense of doubt. Throughout the whole debate he failed to convey any impression of urgency. He said that some members seemed to expect the Board to jump on to one particular social bandwagon, but he appeared totally unaware that in the eyes of many of our fellow countrymen the Church already is on a particular bandwagon. As the Reverend D. A. Rhymes (Southwark) said in this debate, "I do not think I am being unfair in stating that the visual image we so often present is that of a middle-class body primarily catering for and with the outlook of middle class people, neither understanding nor touching

the working-class world, and largely patronised and unheeded by the upper-class world".

There was also another matter on which the Bishop of Leicester gave an unfortunate impression. Two speakers suggested that the statement in the Report that the Secretary "resigned to take up another appointment" was misleading as in fact he took up another appointment because he resigned. As both truth and justice is involved surely some clarification was to be expected from the Bishop. None, however, was offered.

The second reason for our sense of frustration was this: the Assembly was generally agreed that the work and Report of the Board was inadequate, but it was by no means agreed on just what the Board should be doing. On the one hand were those who expected it to lead a crusade against all social evil. On the other were those like Mr. G. Goyder (Oxford) and Mrs. E. M. Sinker (Derby) who rather more sensibly suggested it might begin by concentrating on certain specific aspects of society, whether the family, the problem of teenage vandalism, or industrial relations, and examine them from a soundly based theological stand-point.

The necessity for a theological approach to social problems was urged by many speakers and the Assembly finally passed a motion proposed by the Reverend D. A. Rhymes (in the outstanding speech of the whole session) which recommended the Board to "make a theological assessment of the Doctrines appropriate to the social problems of the age". It also urged them to "keep the whole field of social life in view . . ." and "Assess priorities for action. . . ." This motion was only accepted by the Bishop of Leicester after a warning that he would interpret it in a broad sense. How broad we shall no doubt learn next year, but the Assembly is certainly becoming increasingly impatient to achieve something, if only positive leadership, in this sphere. So perhaps it is right to question whether it is fair to anyone, least of all to the man concerned, that the Chairmanship of this very important Board should be held by the Bishop of a busy diocese.

The fourth major debate during this session of the Assembly was on the General Approval stage of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure. This is an attempt to bring some order into the jungle of Church courts, and also to remove that offensive feature of the present system which can allow a priest to stand trial in the secular courts on doctrinal matters. On the whole, these changes were

welcomed, though Chancellor E. Garth Moore (Ely) and one or two other speakers complained that they still left the machinery far too complicated. Broadly speaking the present intention is to have two parallel systems of courts, one for conduct cases, the other for doctrinal, ritual and ceremonial cases. Mr. Garth Moore suggested that this could well be simplified by a court referring doctrinal points in the form of "Case stated" to a separate tribunal, which could then send back its decisions to be acted on.

In a small way this Measure is the first time the Assembly has attempted a frontal assault on one particular feature of the Establishment. If the Assembly agrees, however, to ask the Archbishops (as they suggested) to set up a high-powered commission to consider crown appointments, then real courage may one day be required. I hope we shall not agree to ask for this unless we intend to find the courage to give more effect to its recommendations than to those of its predecessors.

Our Contributors

Jo Grimond is Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party and Rector of Edinburgh University.

Dunstan Jones is a lay brother of the Community of the Resurrection.

R. M. Appleby is Lecturer in Palaeontology at the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire.

Roger Tennant is a Missionary Priest in Korea. He has just written a short life of Jesus entitled *Born of a Woman*, to be published by S.P.C.K. in October.

John Wren-Lewis is a senior scientist in industry.

Peter Whiteley is a member of the House of Laity of the Church Assembly and Religious Editor of the *Time and Tide* Group of papers.

Where does it end?

Sister Edna Mary, C.S.A.

All our prayer ends, as it begins, in worship, for "worship" means literally giving a person his due. In prayer a man gives his attention to God and recognises Him for what He is—Creator, Redeemer, Strengthener, at once all-powerful and all-holy and all-loving; it is essentially a matter of looking at God with that wonder and love and reverence which is *adoration*.

This is something which does not come naturally, at least to most adults. The primal sin of self-centredness is still strong in most of us; and both emotionally and intellectually the constant temptation, emphasised by the besetting clamour of a secular and sophisticated society, is to put man instead of God at the centre of the universe.

But the Christian recognises that God is the centre, and this recognition requires of him the effort to see human life in the context of eternity—and this may indeed be a great effort. It is very easy to be fully occupied by the sheer business of living. This is true whether life is a joy or a burden or (as it usually is) a mixture of both. The sheer activity of earning a living, the satisfaction of work which uses one's abilities to the full or the frustration of knowing that one has gifts which through circumstances are unused, the contentment of a happy family or the misery of an unhappy one—and the days slip by with little thought of God. But however satisfying or demanding or deadening is daily life, the Christian neglects his primary obligation if he fails to look beyond the circumstances of that life to the God who is at the beginning and end of all life. And in so looking he must endeavour to recapture something of that sense of wonder and awe which comes naturally to a child, who is surrounded by beings bigger and more powerful than himself, but which concentration on the powers and victories of the human race has made so difficult for most adults.

One way of thus directing the attention to God is to look with seeing eyes at what he has created. Centuries ago, consideration of a starry sky could lead a Jew to a paeon of praise of God the Creator of the heavens and of man (Ps. 8). To those who know something of the galaxies of stars which the Psalmist could not see, and of the mechanism of the human body and brain of which he was ignorant,

such consideration should even more readily lead to wonder, and worship of the God whose creation is so wonderful. We tend to take the things around us very much for granted, and adults need even more than children to pray

O give us eyes to see them
And lips that we may tell.

But even more than the sight of God's creation, the thought of His work of redemption should lead the Christian to adoration. The love which prompted the Father to hand over His Son to the utter selfishness of men, the complete humility and self-giving whereby He who "thought it not an act of robbery to be equal with God" put aside His power and His glory and became as helpless as any human baby, homeless in the world He had created, ill-treated and killed by the people He loved, and rising again to show that nothing can defeat self-giving love—the consideration of all this should for the Christian be a source of constant loving adoration.

For some people the consideration of God at work in men can also lead to adoration, as they see the pattern the Holy Spirit weaves in a life. But often that pattern is not clear at the time; and in times when it is not clear it may only be possible to make an act of trust in the Father who is almighty (perhaps in the opening words of the Creed) and then to look at those things outside one's personal circumstances which serve as reminders of God—for they are still there if one will look: the stars still shine however miserable one is, and, more important, God's redemption is still mediated to men in His Church.

The habit of worship is one to be acquired by constant discipline and practice in what may seem little things. The first necessity is the will to adore God. The second is to look for those things which will help us to do so. We can each make our own list of quite prosaic things we encounter daily which, if we will, can point us to God. For some it may be the welcome of wife or parents or children after the day's work, or the habitual kindness of a colleague, reminding of the God of whose love all human love is the reflection; for others it may be natural beauty, the countryside or a garden passed on the way to work, pointing to the Creator of all; for others the calm and relaxation of the evening after a hard day's work, a reminder of the God who is the only source of true peace; for others the Madonna and Child on the wall at home or the Crucifix outside

the church passed every day. The list is different for each individual; but each individual *can* find such reminders in his daily life if he has the will to do so. If he uses them day by day (often forgetting at first, of course, but renewing the effort) he will gradually form a habit which will grow, so that in time the unexpected kindness or beauty he encounters will be an immediate spur to praise God.

Both the desire and the ability to form the habit of spontaneous and immediate worship in this way flow from the place that adoration holds in the times we set apart for attention to God alone. The prayer which Christ taught his disciples begins with worship, and as used liturgically by the Church it also ends with worship; and this should be true of all our prayers. Worship is the starting-point of our prayer, like the personal name we use in addressing a person, the "My dear father" at the head of a letter; it is the end, in that the more we commune with God the more we shall long to express our adoration of him.

This expression may be in words—our own, or words from the Bible or from hymns (used with discretion!). Sometimes it is good to use the great words of praise from the Church's liturgy—the Gloria Patri, Gloria in Excelsis, Sanctus, etc.—for our praise is thereby consciously joined to the unceasing praise of the Church, and we are reminded that God is not only utterly praiseworthy but *is* continually praised, whether or not we feel like taking our part in the chorus.

But often the briefest phrase is best—Magdalene's "Rabboni", Thomas' "My Lord and my God", Thérèse's "Jésus, je t'aime". And best of all, there is silence. The realisation that God is God comes most clearly in the silence (Ps. 46. 10), and the reaction to such realisation may well be silent awe (Hab. 2. 20), for what can man say before his God? In the book of Revelation the worship of the Church in heaven is depicted in terms of the liturgical worship of the Church on earth; but the supreme moment is a moment of silence (Rev. 8. 1). Corporate worship requires words, and so does some of our prayer; but there is room for more silence in prayer than most people allow. Very often adoration is simply silence before God, in the knowledge that all words are inadequate.

This silent adoration is something which should have its place both in our "times of prayer" and throughout the day, for it is a silence which is not dependent on external circumstances. It is rather what Fr. Martindale calls the cloister which the saints, however busy,

have always kept in their hearts. It is the fruit of the recognition that the God who is worthy of all adoration is continually with us, and of the will to turn to him whenever we can.

So adoration, worship, is the context of all our prayer; more, it is the context of all our life. And it has no end. It is not sentimental piety but plain truth to assert that worship is the life of heaven begun on earth. That is why writers on the spiritual life have found such wealth in the story of Martha and Mary. Martha's good works are an integral part of the Christian's life on earth—there is no condemnation of them but only of her suggestion that they are the only essential; and here on earth there are times when the Christian must be prepared to leave his prayers and answer the call to active works, just as the disciples had to leave the Mount of Transfiguration and go down to the tiresome crowd waiting in the plain. But it is the silent attention and worship at the feet of Christ, the adoration on the mountain and in the plain, in the home and about the city streets, which is the better part which does not end with death. There will be no living to earn or hungry family to feed, no sick to tend or bereaved to comfort, in heaven; there will be no longer cause for penitence, and our partial and ill-informed intercessions will no longer be distinct from God's all-loving purpose. But the worship and adoration which we have begun here and now will be our work and our joy through all eternity.

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